Aggregative public good games

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 9, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 201-219

  Cornes, Richard ^a   Hartley, Roger ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34247190664     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00304.x     Document Type: Article

References (26)

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