Community and class antagonism

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 91, Issue 9, 2007, Pages 1816-1842

  Dasgupta, Indraneel ^a   Kanbur, Ravi ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b Department of Molecular Biology and Genetics   (United States)

Author keywords

Class conflict; Community; Distribution; Ethnic conflict; Inequality; Public goods

Indexed keywords

EID: 56349162087     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.03.004     Document Type: Conference Paper

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