The 2001-2002 Indo Pakistani crisis: Exposing the limits of coercive diplomacy

Security Studies

Volumn 14, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 290-324

  Ganguly, Sumit ^a,b   Kraig, Michael R ^c  

^a Department of Political Science ^*  (United States)

^b INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c Stanley Foundation   (Falkland Islands (Malvinas))

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 29244468874     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: 15561852     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636410500232958     Document Type: Review

References (116)

1. For the classic statements on this subject, see Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (1960; repr., Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980);
2. and Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).
3. See Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion. American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might (Cambridge, England: RAND/Cambridge University Press, 2002);
4. and case studies on Somalia, Kosovo, Haiti, North Korea, Iraq, the Taiwan Straits crisis, and Afghanistan in Robert Art and Patrick Cronin, eds., The United States and Coercive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: The United States Institute of Peace, 2003), 21-304.
5. See Michael Kraig, "Program Details," Strategics for US National Security Program (Muscatine, IA: The Stanley Foundation), http://sns.stanleyfoundation.org;
6. Lawrence Korb and Michael Kraig, eds., Strategies for US National Security: Winning the Peace in the 21st Century (Muscatine, IA: The Stanley Foundation, October 2003), http://sns.stanleyfoundation.org/taskforce/index. html;
7. and Dr. James Russell, "Nuclear Strategy and the Modern Middle East," in "Alternative Frameworks for Gulf Security," ed.
8. Michael Kraig, special issue, Middle East Policy Journal 12, no. 2 (fall 2004): 98-117.
9. There is a small but significant body of literature on this subject. The classic statement of coercive diplomacy can be found in Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971);
10. also see Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991). For applications of this concept to a number of Cold War
11. crises see Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, eds., Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1978);
12. Stephen S. Kaplan, Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1981);
13. Kenneth Roberts, "Bullying and Bargaining: The United States, Nicaragua, and Conflict Resolution in Central America," International Security 15, no. 2 (1990): 67-102;
14. and Bruce W. Jentleson, "The Reagan Administration and Coercive Diplomacy: Restraining More Than Remaking Governments," Political Science Quarterly 106, no. 1 (1991): 57-82.
15. Robert Art, "Introduction," in The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, ed. Robert Art and Patrick Cronin (Washington, DC: The United States Institute of Peace, 2003), 10.
16. Robert Art, "Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?" in The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, ed. Robert Art and Patrick Cronin (Washington, DC: The United States Institute of Peace, 2003), 364.
17. Art, "Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?" 363.
18. See case studies on Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo, Haiti, the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis, the U.S. approach to global terrorism, North Korea, and Iraq in The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, ed. Robert Art and Patrick Cronin, (Washington, DC: The United States Institute of Peace, 2003).
19. See George et al., Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 27. The two variants of this strategy are "the try and see approach" and the "tacit ultimatum variant." In a later work, George also discusses a third variant, "the gradual turning of the screw," which calls for the steady, increased application of pressure on the adversary as his compliance with the demands are found wanting over an extended span of time.
20. See George, Forceful Persuasion, 8.
21. Art, "Introduction,"' 7.
22. George et al., Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 22.
23. Art, "Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?" 364.
24. Art, "Introduction," 8.
25. Art, "Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?" 390.
26. Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know? Ibid., 391.
27. Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know? Ibid, 366.
28. Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know? Ibid, 363, 402.
29. See Timothy D. Hoyt, "Politics, Proximity, and Paranoia: The Evolution of Kashmir as a Nuclear Flashpoint," India Review 2 no. 3 (July 2002): 117-148;
30. and Steven Erlanger, "India's Arms Race Isn't Safe Like the Cold War," New York Times, 12 July 1998.
31. For a detailed discussion of Pakistani complicity in the Kashmir insurgency see Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).
32. Michael Kraig, "The Political and Strategic Imperatives of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia," India Rovimc 2, no. 1 (January 2003): 17-30, 35-41. We can not make this argument on the basis of incontrovertible evidence; however, during the Kargil War of 1999 the Indian Air Force was under explicit instructions not to breach the Line of Control in Kashmir for fear of provoking a wider conflict with Pakistan which could be fraught with the possibilities of escalation. On this subject see
33. Suba Chandran, "Limited War with Pakistan: Will It Secure India's Interests?" (Arms Control Disarmament and International Security occasional paper, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2004).
34. On this point see Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and America's War on Terror (Armonk, New York: M.E Sharpe, 2005)
35. and Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).
36. Husain Haqqani and Ashley J. Tellis, India and Pakistan: Is Peace Real this Time?-A Conversation, (Washington, DC: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004), 1-25;
37. Ashley Tellis, C. Christine Fair, and Jamison Jo Medby, Limited Conflict under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), 61, 82.
38. Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002)
39. Celia Dugger, "Pakistan's Arrest of Militant Is 'Step Forward' India Says," New York Times, 22 December 2001.
40. See Sumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
41. Barry Bearak, "26 Die as Suicide Squad Bombs Kashmir Legislative Building," New York Times, 1 October 2001.
42. Economist Global Agenda, "Terror in India," The Economist, 19 December 2001, http://www.economist.com.
43. Celia W. Dugger, "India Raises the Pitch in Criticism of Pakistan," New York Times, 19 December 2001.
44. David E. Sanger and Kurt Eichenwald, "Citing India Attack, U.S. Aims at Assets of Group in Pakistan," New York Times, 21December 2001.
45. Celia W. Dugger, "India Recalling Pakistan Envoy over Delhi Raid," New York Times, 22 December 2001.
46. Howard Witt and Uli Schmerzer, "Missile Alert in Kashmir," Chicago Tribune, 27 December 2001.
47. Major General (rerd.) Ashok K. Mehra, "More Bark Than Eire," Rediff.com India Limited, 31 December 2001, http://www.rediff.com.
48. John F. Burns, "Pakistan Moves against Groups Named by India," New York Times, 29 December 2001.
49. John F. Burns and Celia W. Dugger, "India Builds Up Forces as Bush Urges Calm," New York Times, 30 December 2001.
50. Celia W. Dugger, "Pakistan's Arrest of Militant Is 'Step Forward' India Says," New York Times, 1 January 2002.
51. Paul Watson and Siddhartha Barua, "Camps Thrive in Pakistan, India Charges," Los Angeles Times, 11 January 2002.
52. The Hindu, "We Are Prepared: Army Chief," 12 January 2001;
53. also see Celia W. Dugger, "Indian General Talks Bluntly of War and Nuclear Threat," New York Times, 12 January 2002.
54. See Sumit Ganguly, "From Aid to the Civil to the Defense of the Nation: The Army in Contemporary India," Journal of Asian and African Affairs 26 (1991): 1-12.
55. Pervez Musharraf, text of speech, 12 January 2002, Islamabad, Pakistan, reproduced at www.outlookindia.com.
56. Press Trust of India, "Full Text of Statement Issued by the Ministry of External Affairs," news release, 13 January 2002.
57. Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991), 8-9.
58. Celia W. Dugger, "India Tests Missile, Stirring a Region Already on Edge," New York Times, 26 January 2002. There is some debate as to whether or not this test was simply a routine event or part of the overall strategy of coercive diplomacy. If it was a routine test, the fact that the government of India conducted it at a time of considerable tension suggests that it was a component of the strategy of forceful persuasion.
59. For a discussion of Indian capabilities, see Bharat-Rakshak "Para Commandos," http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Special-Forces/para. html.
60. Rahul Bedi, "A Strike Staunched," Frontline 19, no. 12 (8-12 June 2002), http://frontlineonnet.com/fl1912/9120130.htm. The question of the unavailability of adequate night vision equipment has been questioned in Sumit Ganguly's personal correspondence with a senior retired Indian Army officer, June 2004.
61. On this point see Lt.Gen. (retd.) V.K. Sood and Pravin Sawhney, Operation Parakram: The War Unfinished (New Delhi: Sage, 2003).
62. Todd S. Purdum and Celia W. Dugger, "Powell Now 'Very Encouraged' on Kashmir," New York Times, 19 January 2002.
63. Edward Luce and Farhan Bokhari, "Bombers Kill 33 in Kashmir as us Envoy Visits India," Financial Times, 15 May 2002.
64. Edward Luce, "India Prepares for Strike on Camps," Financial Times, 17 May 2002, http://www.ft.com.
65. Edward Luce, "Kashmir Killing Seen as Talks Warning," Financial Times, 22 May 2002, http://www.ft.com.
66. Reuters, "Indian PM Calls for 'Decisive Fight,'" 22 May 2002.
67. Barry Schweid, "Powell Confers with Musharraf as Bush Administration Turns Up Heat on Pakistan to Curb Extremists," Associated Press, 23 May 2002.
68. Howard W. French, "Pakistan Prepares to Shift Troops from Afghan Border to Kashmir," New York Times, 24 May 2002.
69. Celia W. Dugger, "India Reacts Angrily to Pakistani's Speech," New York Times, 26 May 2002.
70. Josy Joseph, "The Mood Is for War," India Abroad, 31 May 2002.
71. Elisabeth Bumiller and Thorn Shanker, "Bush Presses Pakistan on Kashmir and Orders Rumsfeld to Region," New York Times, 31 May 2002.
72. Thom Shanker and Elisabeth Bumiller, "Citing Tensions U.S. Advises Americans in India to Leave," New York Times, 31 May 2002.
73. Raymond Bonner, "India Believes Pakistan Restrains Militants," New York Times, 6 June 2002.
74. Edward Luce and Richard Wolffe, "US Makes Headway Calming Antagonists," Financial Times, 7 June 2002, http://www.ft.com.
75. Josy Joseph, "India Removes Overflight Ban on Pakistani Aircraft," India Abroad, 21 June 2002.
76. Haqqani and Tellis, India and Pakistan, 8.
77. Praveen Swami, "Face the Facts," Outlook India.com, 1 June 2004, http://www.outlookindia.com;
78. see also Praveen Swami, "Groping in the Dark," Frontline Magazine 19, no. 25 (07-20 December 2002), http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1925/ stories/20021220007412300.htm;
79. and Praveen Swami, "From Kargil to Sarp Vinash," Frontline Magazine. 20, no. 14 (05-18 July 2003), http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2014/ stories/20030718004502000.htm.
80. Amy Waldman, "Kashmir Massacre May Signal the Coming of Widespread Violence," New York Times, 25 March 2003.
81. Haqqani and Tellis, India and Pakistan, 12-13, 16;
82. Tellis et al. Limited Conflict, 61-67.
83. Haqqani and Tellis, India and Pakistan, 4.
84. For a discussion of the tenuous legitimacy of the Pakistani regime of General Pervez Musharraf see Sumit Ganguly, "Pakistan's Never Ending Story: Why the October Coup Was No Surprise," Foreign Affairs 79, no. 2 (2002): 2-7.
85. In fairness, India did offer a reward of sorts: the normalization of relations. Pakistan's military rulers, however, were too myopic to see this as a worthwhile offer.
86. Praveen Swami, The Kargil War (New Delhi: LeftWord Books, 2000).
87. Rahul Bedi, "The Military Dynamics," Frontline Magazine 19, no. 12 (8-21 June 2002), http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1912/19120100.htm.
88. V. Sudarshan and Ajith Pillai, ''Game of Patience,'' Outlook, 27 May 2002, 34-39. These views were independently confirmed to Sumit Ganguly in an interview with Brajesh Mishra, the former Indian national security adviser, in July 2004.
89. Haider K. Nizamani, The Roots of Rbetoric: Politics of Nuclear Weapons in India and Pakistan (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2000), 79-83;
90. see also Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 51-52, 71-72.
91. Nizamani, Roots of Rhetoric, 79.
92. Ganguly, Conflict Unending, 52.
93. See "Intra-Military and Other Institutional Issues" and "The Long-term Dangers of Islamic Fundamentalism" in Gaurav Kampani, "Nuclear Watch-Pakistan: The Sony Affairs of the Islamic Republic," Center for Nonproliferation Studies Issue Brief, (Monterey, California; Monterey Institute for International Studies, January 2004);
94. and Stephen Cohen, ''The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan," The Washington Quarterly 26, no. 3 (2003): 20-21.
95. Tellis et al., Limited Conflict, 83.
96. Brajesh Mishra, former Indian National Security Adviser,interview with Sumit Ganguly, New Delhi, January 2005; See the conventional scenarios outlined in Sunil S, "Thoughts on Operation Parakram," Bharat Rakshak Monitor (New Delhi, India) 5, no. 5 (March-April 2003), http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/ MONITOR/ISSUE5-5/Sunils.html;
97. and Lieutenant General, (retd) AM Vohra, "Military Power: Potential and Limitations," Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, (New Delhi, India) article 1125 (3 September 2003), in Issues: Kashmir, http://www.ipcs.org/ ipcs/issueIndex2.jsp?action=showView&kValue=1133&issue=1012&status= article&mod=b. Some Indian military commentators, however, have argued that India still lacks the requisite tri-service coordination to carry out effective special operations.
98. This "script" summarizes a mass of material on the social and political discourse of Pakistani state identity in Nizamani, Roots of Rhetoric, 71-118.
99. Cohen, "Jihadist Threat to Pakistan," 19.
100. Art, "Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?" 366-67.
101. Art, "Introduction," 10;
102. and "Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?" 361, 363-64, 372, 402.
103. Praveen Swami, "Gen. Padmanabhan mulls over lessons of Operation Parakram," The Hindu, 6 February 2004, http://www.hindu.com/2004/02/06/ stories/2004020604461200.htm.
104. NEWSINSIGHT.net, "Army delays degradation operation," (25 May, 2002), http://www.intelligenceonline.net/India.asp?recno=979&id= 153055100241551&sub=top.
105. Tellis et al., Limited Conflict, 78.
106. See the summation of such interactions in Michael Kraig, "The Political and Strategic Imperatives of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia," 30-35.
107. P.R. Chari, review of The Defence Makeoivr: 10 Myths that Shape. India's Image,
108. by Pravin Sawhney, P.R. Chari, "India's Defence Environment," Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, http://www.ipcs.org/newDisplayReview. jsp?kValue=38.
109. Art, "Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?" 369, 372.
110. C. Raja Mohan, interview by author, January 2003.
111. On the Indian aversion to the presence of a third party in the affairs of the subcontinent see J. N. Dixit, India-Pakistan in War and Peace (New Delhi: Books Today, 2002).
112. Sumit Ganguly, "From Aid to the Civil to the Defense of the Nation: The Army in Contemporary India," in Civil Military Interaction in Asia and Africa, ed. Charles H. Kennedy and David J. Louscher (Leiden: EJ. Brill, 1991), 11-26.
113. On the Pakistani military's involvement in the Kashmiri insurgency see Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000).
114. The American difficulty of courting Pakistan while still addressing India's concerns is discussed well in Aziz Haniffa, Aziz, "Musharraf's Turnaround May Make India Talk," India Abroad, 25 January 2002.
115. Tellis et al., Limited Conflict, 5-31;
116. see also Timothy D. Hoyt, "Politics, Proximity, and Paranoia," 117-148.