Cities, economic development, and the free trade constitution

Virginia Law Review

Volumn 94, Issue 5, 2008, Pages 1091-1164

  Schragger, Richard C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 55449086262     PISSN: 00426601     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (318)

1. See H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 538 (1949) ("The material success that has come to inhabitants of the states which make up this federal free trade unit has been the most impressive in the history of commerce, but the established interdependence of the states only emphasizes the necessity of protecting interstate movement of goods against local burdens and repressions."); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935) (noting that our Constitution arose under "the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division"); see also Laurence H. Tribe, 1 American Constitutional Law 1057-58 (3d ed. 2000); Jim Chen, Pax Mercatoria: Globalization as a Second Chance at "Peace for Our Time," 24 Fordham Int'l L.J. 217, 230-33 (2000);
2. Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 Mich L. Rev. 1091, 1098-1101 (1986). Of course, the canonical view, like much in constitutional law, is contested.
3. See Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 Yale L.J. 425, 430 (1982) (suggesting that the Constitution made no attempt to deal extensively with free trade);
4. Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 Duke L.J. 569, 599-601 (rejecting the idea that constitutional principles such as free trade may be created when such principles are not textually supported);
5. Robert A. Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clause as a Restriction on State Regulation and Taxation: An Analysis in Terms of Constitutional Structure, 31 Wayne L. Rev. 885, 987 (1985) ("It is doubtful that there is any evidence to indicate that a major historic purpose for the commerce clause was to create a free trade area among the states . . . . ").
6. Holmes's famous (and oft-quoted) statement about the need for judicial oversight of state and local commercial regulations captures this view. He declared: I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several States. For one in my place sees how often a local policy prevails with those who are not trained to national views and how often action is taken that embodies what the Commerce Clause was meant to end. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Collected Legal Papers 295-96 (1921). Despite some significant controversy among the current Justices, the Court continues to review local and state laws for protectionist purposes or effects, declaring recently that the dormant commerce clause creates an "area of free trade among the several states." See Associated Indus, of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 650 (1994); see also Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472-73 (2005). But see Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("That the expansion effected by today's decision finds some support in the morass of our negative Commerce Clause case law only serves to highlight the need to abandon that failed jurisprudence and to consider restoring the original Import-Export Clause check on discriminatory state taxation to what appears to be its proper role."); General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278. 312 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[T]he so-called 'negative' Commerce Clause is an unjustified judicial invention.").
7. See, e.g., H. P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 538; Chen, supra note 1, at 230-33.
8. See generally Barry Bluestone & Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America (1982);
9. Michael J. Greenwood & Gary L. Hunt, Migration and Interregional Employment Redistribution in the United States, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. 957 (1984);
10. Edward L. Glaeser & Matthew E. Kahn, Decentralized Employment and the Transformation of the American City (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8117, 2001) (discussing the trend of movement of people and labor into suburbs and edge cities).
11. I use "city" here and throughout the paper to describe a range of municipalities - from smaller towns to large metropolises. This use of "city" is conceptual and emphasizes the legal and economic commonalities among local governments. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1059 (1980).
12. Those commonalities have important limits, however. Cf. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II - Localism and Legal Theory, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 346, 347-48 (1990) (arguing that Frug's definition of "city" includes communities that are neither complex nor heterogeneous - two qualities a community must possess to be a "city" under the social and political concepts of the term). When it is important to differentiate between suburbs, small towns, central cities, and edge cities, I do so explicitly.
13. See, e.g., Jane Jacobs, Cities and the Wealth of Nations: Principles of Economic Life 32 (1984); The World Goes to Town, Economist, May 5, 2007, at 3 ("Cities' development is synonymous with human development.").
14. Global Insight, Inc., The Role of Metro Areas in the U.S. Economy 6 (2006).
15. William Thomas Bogart, The Economics of Cities and Suburbs 4-5 (1998).
16. Global Insight, Inc., supra note 7, at 15.
17. See Bogart, supra note 8, at 4; Jacobs, supra note 6, at 32; Paul Krugman, Geography and Trade 3 (1991).
18. Jane Jacobs, The Economy of Cities 262 (1970).
19. Tribe, supra note 1, at 1080-85.
20. Id. at 1255-70.
21. Regan, supra note 1, at 1277.
22. Id. at 1186.
23. Tribe, supra note 1, at 1061-62.
24. See, e.g., Paul E. Peterson, City Limits 28 (1981).
25. See Mark Schneider, The Competitive City 125-26 (1989).
26. Arthur O'Sullivan, Urban Economics 84-85 (6th ed. 2007).
27. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
28. 547 U.S. 332 (2006).
29. There is voluminous literature on Kelo, much of it critical. See, e.g., Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 491 (2006); Orlando E. Delogu, Kelo v. City of New London - Wrongly Decided and a Missed Opportunity for Principled Line Drawing With Respect to Eminent Domain Takings, 58 Me. L. Rev. 18 (2006); Dean Allen Floyd II, Irrational Basis: The Supreme Court, Inner Cities, and the New "Manifest Destiny," 23 Harv. BlackLetter L.J. 55 (2007);
30. Timothy Sandefur, The "Backlash" So Far: Will Americans Get Meaningful Eminent Domain Reform?, 2006 Mich. St. L. Rev. 709;
31. Eric L. Silkwood, The Downlow on Kelo: How an Expansive Interpretation of the Public Use Clause Has Opened the Floodgates for Eminent Domain Abuse, 109 W. Va. L. Rev. 493 (2007);
32. Laura S. Underkuffler, Kelo's Moral Failure, 15 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 377 (2006). The popular reaction has been even more critical. See Greg Blankenship, Letter to the Editor, We Must Fight Against the Tyranny of Kelo, Wall St. J., July 6, 2006, at A15; Editorial, Eminent-domain Wars, Wash. Times, June 21, 2006, at A20;
33. Jonathan V. Last, The Kelo Backlash, Wkly. Standard (Wash., D.C.), August 21, 2006, at 14;
34. Carol Saviak, Property Rights at Risk 2 Years After Kelo Ruling, Abuse of Power Continues, Orlando Sentinel, June 27, 2007, at A11; Sen. Kyl Blasts Supreme Court 'Kelo' Decision at Judiciary Committee Hearing, U.S. Fed. News, September 20, 2005.
35. 547 U.S. at 338.
36. Id.
37. See The Brookings Institution, Restoring Prosperity: The State Role in Revitalizing America's Older Industrial Cities 69-76 (2007).
38. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 18, at 210-11.
39. Cf. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (describing the balance between legitimate local government interests and the need to not burden interstate commerce).
40. With apologies to Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, supra note 5.
41. Jacobs, supra note 6, at 31-32.
42. Id. at 32.
43. See, e.g., Mario Polèse, Cities and National Economic Growth: A Reappraisal, 42 Urb. Stud. 1429 (2005);
44. Peter J. Taylor, Comment: On a Non-Appraisal of the 'Jacobs Hypothesis,' 43 Urb. Stud. 1625 (2006);
45. Mario Polèse, On the Non-City Foundations of Economic Growth and the Unverifiability of the 'Jacobs Hypothesis': A Reply to Peter Taylor's Comment, 43 Urb. Stud. 1631 (2006).
46. Saskia Sassen, Introduction to Global Networks, Linked Cities 1, 1 (Saskia Sassen ed., 2002).
47. Paul L. Knox, World Cities in a World-System, in World Cities in a World-System 3 (Paul L. Knox & Peter J. Taylor eds., 1995);
48. Saskia Sassen, The Global City (1991);
49. Allen J. Scott, Technopolis: High-Technology Industry and Regional Development in Southern California (1993);
50. Jeffrey Kentor, The Growth of Transnational Corporate Networks: 1962-1998, 11 J. World-Sys. Res. 263 (2005).
51. See Richard Florida, Cities and the Creative Class 1 (2005);
52. Jacobs, supra note 6; see also Gerald A. Carlino et al., Urban Density and the Rate of Invention, 61 J. Urb. Econ. 389 (2007);
53. Maryann P. Feldman & Richard Florida, The Geographic Sources of Innovation: Technological Infrastructure and Product Innovation in the United States, 84 Annals Ass'n Am. Geo. 210 (1994).
54. See David Nowlan, Jane Jacobs Among the Economists, in Ideas That Matter: The Worlds of Jane Jacobs 111-13 (Max Allen ed., 1997).
55. Global Insight, supra note 7, app. at 41 tbl.6.
56. Jacobs, supra note 11, at 59.
57. Jacobs, supra note 6, at 208.
58. Florida, supra note 34, at 1.
59. Id. at 6.
60. The city is also the chief agent of demographic change in the developing world. See Panel on Urban Population Dynamics, Nat'l Research Council, Cities Transformed: Demographic Change and Its Implications in the Developing World 17-25, 76-95 (Mark R. Montgomery et al. eds., 2003).
61. See Richard Moe & Carter Wilkie, Changing Places: Rebuilding Community in the Age of Sprawl 36-74 (1997);
62. Alan Rabinowitz, Urban Economics and Land Use in America: The Transformation of Cities in the Twentieth Century (2004);
63. Willem van Vliet, The United States, in Sustainable Cities: Urbanization and the Environment in International Perspective 169, 172-73 (Richard Stren et al. eds., 1992).
64. U.S. Census Bureau, United States Summary 5 tbl.4 (1993), http://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/table-4.pdf.
65. U.S. Census Bureau, United States-Urban/Rural and Inside/Outside Metropolitan Area (2000), http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/GCTTable?_bm= y&-geo_id=01000US&-_box_head_nbr=GCT-P1&-ds_name= DEC_2000_SF1_U&-format=US-1.
66. See Rabinowitz, supra note 42; Jon C. Teaford, The Metropolitan Revolution: The Rise of Post-Urban America (2006).
67. See text accompanying notes 43 and 44 (citing census statistics on move from a rural population to an urban population).
68. See Carl Abbot, Urbanization, in 8 Dictionary of American History 288, 289 (Stanley I. Kutler ed., 3d ed. 2003).
69. See id.
70. William Cronon, Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West 266-67 (1991).
71. Id. at 120.
72. Id. at 82-83.
73. Campbell Gibson, U.S. Census Bureau, Population of the 100 Largest Cities and Other Urban Places in the United States: 1790 to 1990, tbls.13 & 15 (1998), http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027.html (under "Detailed Tables," follow "13" hyperlink and "15" hyperlink).
74. Nicholas Lemann, The Promised Land: The Great Black Migration and How it Changed America (1991).
75. U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2007, at 8 tbl.5 (2006), http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/07statab/pop.pdf.
76. Alexander von Hoffman & John Felkner, The Historical Origins and Causes of Urban Decentralization in the United States 17-18 (2002);
77. Peter Mieszkowski & Edwin S. Mills, The Causes of Metropolitan Suburbanization, 7 J. Econ. Persp., Summer 1993, at 135, 135 ("In the 1950s, 57 percent of [Metropolitan Statistical Areas] residents and 70 percent of MSA jobs were located in central cities; in 1960, the percentages were 49 and 63; in 1970, they were 43 and 55; in 1980, they were 40 and 50; in 1990, they were about 37 and 45.");
78. see also Brian J.L. Berry, Inner City Futures: An American Dilemma Revisited, 5 Transactions Inst. Brit. Geographers (n.s.) 1, 12-13 (1980);
79. Allen C. Goodman, Central Cities and Housing Supply: Growth and Decline in US Cities, 14 J. Housing Econ. 315, 320-21 (2005).
80. U.S. Census Bureau, Ranking Tables for Metropolitan Areas: 1990 and 2000, tbl.1 (2001), http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/phc-t3/tab01.pdf [hereinafter Ranking Tables].
81. Id.
82. Chicago is part of the Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI Metropolitan Statistical Area, which includes Kenosha to the north and Joliet to the south. See Office of Mgmt. and Budget, Update of Statistical Area Definitions and Guidance on Their Uses, OMB Bulletin No. 07-01 app. at 28 (Dec. 18, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/bulletins/fy2007/b07-01.pdf.
83. Ranking Tables, supra note 56; U.S. Census Bureau, State & County Quickfacts: Texas, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48000.html (last visited July 1, 2008).
84. Ranking Tables, supra note 56; U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts: Colorado, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/08000.html (last visited July 1, 2008).
85. Ranking Tables, supra note 56; U.S. Census Bureau, State & County Quickfacts: Georgia, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/13000.html (last visited July 1, 2008).
86. Global Insight, Inc., supra note 7, app. at 40 tbl.5.
87. Id. app. at 15 tbl.3. In addition, New York City's municipal budget is larger than all but three state budgets (California, New York, and Texas). U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 54, at 288-89 tbl.443, 295 tbl.447.
88. Global Insight, Inc., supra note 7, app. at 15 tbl.3.
89. Id. at 6.
90. Thomas Michael Power, Lost Landscapes and Failed Economies 37 (1996).
91. Paul Krugman, Pop Internationalism 211 (1996).
92. See Tanya Lee & Michael J. Trebilcock, Economic Mobility and Constitutional Reform, 37 U. Toronto L.J. 268, 278 (1987); see also Peterson, supra note 17, at 25-27.
93. Lee & Trebilcock, supra note 68, at 278-79. Of course, Congress also adopts rules that distort the common market (agricultural subsidies are but one example), but for my purposes, I assume that Congress has more authority than do states and cities, and so do not examine those policies here.
94. Whether it is good policy for Congress, states or municipalities to raise impediments to the inter-jurisdictional mobility of persons and economic resources is not my primary focus here. Nevertheless, to the extent the Court has a theory of the American common market, that theory is an anti-protectionist one. Regan, supra note 1, at 1176. The doctrine, however, is beset by tensions - as would any set of rules that seeks to maintain open markets while respecting the regulatory and taxing authority of sub-federal governments. Indeed, it is an understatement to say that the current constitutional free trade regime is unsettled in significant ways.
95. Lee and Trebilcock also employ these categories. See Lee & Trebilcock, supra note 68, at 278-79. Trade scholars might be more familiar with a quad-partite division, which also includes services. For example, the European Union guarantees four freedoms: free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor. I treat goods and services together here; the differences are not significant enough for my purposes.
96. Sassen, supra note 33, at 19-21, 323-24.
97. See Winnie Hu, Mayor Widens Privacy Rights For Immigrants, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 2003, at B1;
98. Tony Favro, US Mayors Concerned about Collapse of Immigration Reform, July 16, 2007, http://www.citymayors.com/society/us-immigration.html.
99. Compare Associated Press, Connecticut City Helps Illegal Immigrants Get IDs, St. Petersburg Times, July 25, 2007, at 2 (discussing New Haven, Conn.), Ken Maguire, City Is a Sanctuary for Illegal Immigrants - If Any Can Afford It, Associated Press Newswires, May 7, 2006 (Cambridge, Mass.), and City Embraces Illegal Immigration Instead of Fighting It, Associated Press Newswires, May 14, 2006 (Painesville, Ohio), with Michael Powell & Michelle Garcia, Pa. City Puts Illegal Immigrants on Notice, Wash. Post, Aug. 22, 2006, at A3 (Hazleton, Pa.), and Pat Broderick, Escondido Bans Apartment Rentals for Illegal Immigrants, San Diego Bus. J., Oct. 23, 2006, at 43 (Escondido, Cal.).
100. Recent scholarship has questioned the practical and structural basis for this constitutional exclusivity. See, e.g., Christina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 567, 570-71 (2008) (arguing that the federal, state, and local governments "form part of an integrated regulatory structure").
101. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966).
102. 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
103. Id.
104. 314 U.S. 160, 174 (1941).
105. 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969); see also Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 332-33 (1972).
106. 526 U.S. 489, 503 (1999).
107. 314 U.S. 160, 173 (1941); see also Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 49 (1867) (striking down tax on every person leaving the state by common carrier).
108. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629; see Saenz, 526 U.S. at 499.
109. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 68 (1982) (observing that if a state is able to limit or discourage inter-state migration, "the mobility so essential to the economic progress of our Nation, and so commonly accepted as a fundamental aspect of our so-cial order, would not long survive").
110. While there are still some interstate restrictions on labor mobility that have anti-competitive effects, rules that explicitly seek to prevent out-of-staters from working in-state by requiring residency as a prerequisite for employment, or statutes that discriminate against in-state employees who live out of state, have repeatedly been struck down on Commerce Clause grounds. See, e.g., Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 657 (1975) (striking down state tax on income earned by non-residents); cf. McCarthy v. Phila. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645, 646-47 (1976) (upholding a continual residency requirement for municipally employed fire fighters). Moreover, states cannot discriminate against out-of-staters if the purpose appears to be protectionist in nature. This doctrine does not prevent states from requiring that a person become a resident in order to access some non-fundamental benefits of state citizenship, such as welfare benefits, but it does require that states not raise outright barriers or significant disincentives to obtaining state citizenship. See, e.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973) (upholding residency requirements for in-state college tuition breaks as long as a residency decision can be challenged).
111. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 219 (1984).
112. Id. at 215-216.
113. Id. at 211.
114. White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 214-15 (1983). The market participant exception shields protectionist policies when the government is acting as a participant and not a regulator of the market.
115. Camden, 465 U.S. at 217-18.
116. Id. at 231 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 217 (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948)).
118. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 504.
119. Id. at 502. In-state residents cannot bring challenges under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Court has yet to determine if there is a right to intrastate travel. Nevertheless, some courts have found such a right. See Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis of Official Efforts to Drive Homeless Persons from American Cities, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 631, 651-53 (1992).
120. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
121. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
122. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668 (1976); Village of BeUe Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); see also Constr. Indus. Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 904 (9th Cir. 1975) (rejecting challenge to local growth control ordinances based on a right to travel).
123. 422 U.S. at 504-06.
124. 416 U.S. at 7. The Court sidestepped a right to travel claim in Nordlinger v. Hahn, a case that upheld a California property tax scheme that favored long-time homeowners over more recent ones. 505 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1992) (holding that the petitioner did not have standing to assert a right to travel because she lived in California).
125. William A. Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis 54 (2001) ("[T]he U.S. Constitution . . . does not permit states to restrict immigration from other states . . . [but l]ocal government regulations . . . get pretty much a free pass on the same issue.");
126. John R. Logan & Harvey L. Molotch, Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place 41 (2001) ("Whereas the courts have frequently overturned local legislation that interferes with 'interstate commerce,' they have allowed many constraints on residential migration to stand.");
127. see also William T. Bogart, "Trading Places": The Role of Zoning in Promoting and Discouraging Intrametropolitan Trade, 51 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 697, 709 (2001) (observing that though it is illegal for municipalities to set a minimum house value, they can achieve the same goal through fiscal zoning);
128. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Poverty, Residency, and Federalism: States' Duty of Impartiality Toward Newcomers, 1999 Sup. Ct. Rev. 277, 277-78 (observing the disjuncture between the rhetoric in Saenz and the Court's tolerance of access controls at the local level).
129. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 418-19 (N.J. 1983); S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 724-25 (N.J. 1975).
130. See, e.g., Bogart, supra note 8, at 241-43.
131. See generally Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, The Effect of Land Use Regulation on Housing and Land Prices, 61 J. Urb. Econ. 420 (2007);
132. Edward L. Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Impact of Zoning on Housing Affordability (Harv. Inst. of Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 1948, 2002), available at http://economics.harvard.edu/pub/hier/2002/HIER1948.pdf.
133. S. Burlington County NAACP, 336 A.2d at 723;
134. see also Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, Introduction: Exclusionary Land Use Regulations, 41 Urb. Stud. 255, 256-57 (2004);
135. Stewart E. Sterk, Competition Among Municipalities as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 831, 839-41 (1992).
136. See Fischel, supra note 100, at 54.
137. Indeed, some economists have argued that fiscal zoning is efficient insofar as it prevents lower-income newcomers from free-riding on the public service expenditures of current residents. Zoning ensures that new development will "pay its own way," by indirectly mandating a minimum property value, thus ensuring that all residents will pay roughly the same amount in property taxes for services received. See id. at 65-67; Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local Governments, 12 Urb. Stud. 205, 206 (1975).
138. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 506; see also Joan M. Crouse, Precedents from the Past: The Evolution of Laws and Attitudes Pertinent to the "Welcome" Accorded to the Indigent Transient During the Great Depression, in An American Historian: Essays to Honor Selig Adler 191-203 (Milton Pleseur ed., 1980);
139. Stephen Loffredo, "If You Ain't Got the Do, Re, Mi": The Commerce Clause and State Residence Restrictions on Welfare, 11 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 147, 165-66 (1993);
140. Note, Depression Migrants and the States, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1031, 1033-34 (1940). But see Hills, supra note 100, at 325 (arguing that California's fiscal motives were secondary to its concern that new migrants would change the social, cultural, and political nature of the state).
141. Cf. Hills, supra note 100, at 311-12 (arguing that the Court could distinguish local from state restrictions on mobility on the ground that such restrictions might be appropriate for those communities tied together by bonds of mutual affection or trust, like neighborhoods, but not appropriate for larger communities, like states).
142. It should be noted that Congress has entered into trade agreements that impose limitations on state and local regulatory practices. For a discussion of how international trade agreements might limit a city's land use authority, see Gerald E. Frug & David J. Barron, International Local Government Law, 38 Urb. Law. 1, 39-52 (2006).
143. Kathleen M. Sullivan & Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 257 (15th ed. 2004).
144. Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law 402-23 (2d ed. 2005).
145. Regan, supra note 1, at 1240-41.
146. Chemerinsky, supra note 111, at 426-31.
147. White v. Mass. Council, 460 U.S. 204, 214-15 (1983). As I have already noted, the market participant exception does not apply to challenges under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 219-20 (1984).
148. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1951).
149. C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 386 (1994).
150. 117127 S. Ct. 1786 (2007).
151. Id. at 1795-96.
152. Id. at 1796 (citing United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 261 F.3d 245, 264 (2001) (Calabresi, J., concurring)).
153. Id. at 1797 n.7 ( "[L]ocal government may facilitate a customary and traditional government function such as waste disposal . . . .").
154. Id. at 1798 (finding that waste control is a "typical and traditional concern of local government").
155. The market participant and publicly owned monopoly rules depend on distinctions - public/private, regulatory/proprietary, local/national - that have been regularly criticized for lacking a conceptual or functional basis. See, e.g., Glen O. Robinson, The Sherman Act as a Home Rule Charter: Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 2 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 131, 131-32 (1983). Indeed, the potential emergence of a public/private distinction that turns on a "traditional municipal functions" category in dormant commerce clause cases is somewhat surprising, especially in the context of waste disposal. Much dormant commerce clause doctrine has been made in cases involving efforts by states or localities to bar the entry of out-of-area waste. Richard A. Epstein, Waste & the Dormant Commerce Clause, 3 Green Bag 2d 29, 34-35 (1999). The Court has been fairly rigorous in treating municipal waste like any other good in the stream of commerce: facial bans on out-of-state importation of waste have been struck down even if their ostensible purpose was to preserve landfill space or control pollution externalities, as opposed to protect in-state economic interests. See, e.g., C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Mich. Dep't of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353 (1992); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
156. See Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 Yale L.J. 385, 390-92 (1977);
157. William A. Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for its Exclusionary Effects, 41 Urb. Stud. 317, 317-18 (2004);
158. John M. Baker & Mehmet K. Konar-Steenberg, "Drawn from Local Knowledge . . . and Conformed to Local Wants": Zoning and Incremental Reform of Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 38 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 1, 16-19 (2006).
159. See Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 103, at 5; see also Edward L. Glaeser & Bryce A. Ward, The Causes and Consequences of Land Use Regulation: Evidence from Greater Boston 1-2 (Harv. Inst. Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 2124, 2006), available at http://economics.harvard.edu/pub/hier/2006/ HIER2124.pdf (noting that land use regulations, and not a shortage of land, have made it more difficult to construct new housing).
160. Ellickson, supra note 123, at 404-07; see also Jonathan Levine, Zoned Out: Regulation, Markets, and Choices in Transportation and Metropolitan Land-Use (2006).
161. Bogart, supra note 100, at 715; see also Bogart, supra note 8, at 212-14.
162. Bogart, supra note 8, at 85.
163. Cf. Paul Krugman, Development, Geography, and Economic Theory 52-55 (1995) (discussing Von Thünen's land use and land rent ideas).
164. Bogart, supra note 8, at 229; Bogart, supra note 100, at 716-18; see also Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 385 (1926) (noting the appellant's argument "that the ordinance constitutes a cloud upon the land, reduces and destroys its value, and has the effect of diverting the normal industrial, commercial and residential development thereof to other and less favorable locations").
165. S.F., Cal., Planning Code art. 7, § 703.3(a)(2) (2004) ("San Francisco needs to protect its vibrant small business sector and create a supportive environment for new small business innovations. One of the eight Priority Policies of the City's General Plan resolves that 'existing neighborhood-serving retail uses be preserved and enhanced and future opportunities for resident employment in and ownership of such businesses enhanced.'").
166. Some scholars have predicted that recent municipal efforts to limit development may generate a flood of land use cases "in which the dormant Commerce Clause plays a significant role." Baker & Konar-Steenberg, supra note 123, at 2-3. For further commentary, see Brannon P. Denning & Rachel M. Lary, Retail Store Size-Capping Ordinances and the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 37 Urb. Law. 907, 908 (2005);
167. George Lefcoe, The Regulation of Superstores: The Legality of Zoning Ordinances Emerging from the Skirmishes Between Wal-Mart and the United Food and Commercial Workers Union, 58 Ark. L. Rev. 833 (2006);
168. Justin Shoemake, Note, The Smalling of America?: Growth Management Statutes and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 48 Duke L.J. 891, 894 (1999);
169. Suellen M. Wolfe, Municipal Finance and the Commerce Clause: Are User Fees the Next Target of the "Silver Bullet"?, 26 Stetson L. Rev. 727, 757 (1997). So far, the legal landscape is hostile to dormant commerce clause challenges. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores v. Turlock, 483 F. Supp. 2d 987, 1020 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (granting summary judgment for the defendants on grounds that city retail size ordinance did not violate the Commerce Clause); Coronadans Organized for Retail Enhancement v. City of Coronado, No. D040293, 2003 WL 21363665 (Cal. Ct. App. June 13, 2003) (holding that an ordinance which placed restrictions on certain types of retail businesses did not violate the Commerce Clause). But see, e.g., Colo. Manufactured Hous. Ass'n. v. Pueblo County, 857 P.2d 507 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a builder and dealer of manufactured houses had standing to challenge the validity of a local zoning ordinance on the grounds that the ordinance violated the Commerce Clause); Island Silver & Spice, Inc. v. Islamorada, Village of Islands, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (holding that a village ordinance banning retail establishments such as drug stores violated the Commerce Clause); Frug & Barron, supra note 109, at 36-52 (describing how international trade agreements have been used in a few instances to challenge local land use decisions).
170. Daniel J. Gifford, Federalism, Efficiency, the Commerce Clause, and the Sherman Act: Why We Should Follow a Consistent Free-Market Policy, 44 Emory L.J. 1227, 1228-29, 1233-35 (1995);
171. see also Jim Rossi, Political Bargaining and Judicial Intervention in Constitutional and Antitrust Federalism, 83 Wash. U. L.Q. 521, 524-26 (2005) (recognizing the connections between the two doctrines and arguing that they both share a common concern with political (and not just market) failure).
172. 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943).
173. Daniel J. Gifford, Antitrust and Its Intellectual Milieu, 42 Antitrust Bull. 333, 360-63 (1997).
174. 455 U.S. 40, 57 (1982).
175. Id. at 51 (quoting City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412-13 (1978)).
176. Id. at 53 (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943)). Boulder did not involve a discussion of traditional municipal functions or the relevant differences between public and private anticompetitive activities. Indeed, the Court explicitly rejected the proprietary/regulatory distinction that it used to uphold the flow control ordinance in Oneida-Herkimer.
177. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1990).
178. Daniel R. Mandelker et al., State and Local Government in a Federal System 603 (6th ed. 2006); see also City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., 499 U.S. 365, 384 (1991); Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 270 (1986).
179. Fisher, 475 U.S. at 278 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
180. 499 U.S. at 373; see Robert C. Ellickson & Vicki L. Been, Land Use Controls: Cases and Materials 124 (3d ed. 2005); Mandelker et. al., supra note 139, 603;
181. E. Thomas Sullivan, Antitrust Regulation of Land Use: Federalism's Triumph Over Competition, The Last Fifty Years, 3 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 473, 480 (2000).
182. See Omni Outdoor Adver., 499 U.S. at 384; Fisher, 475 U.S. at 265-67; Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985); Rossi, supra note 132, at 549-50. It is likely that the transfer station monopoly at issue in Oneida-Herkimer was authorized by the state and thus would be immune from Sherman Act challenge as well. See id. After Boulder, Congress adopted the Local Government Antitrust Act to limit municipal exposure to liability.
183. See Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (1988) (limiting remedies against local governments for antitrust violations to injunctive relief).
184. Whether this distinction makes sense is not my concern here. Cf. Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political Process, 96 Yale. L.J. 486, 494-98 (1987) (arguing that the distinction does not make sense).
185. 545 U.S. 469, 494 (2005).
186. But see Gifford, supra note 132, at 359-60 (discussing local taxicab cartels).
187. Charles W. McCurdy, American Law and the Marketing Structure of the Large Corporation, 1875-1890, 38 J. Econ. Hist. 631, 648 (1978).
188. Id. at 638-43.
189. Regan, supra note 1, at 1275.
190. See Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business Development Incentives, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 789, 790 (1996).
191. Krugman, supra note 128, at 52-55.
192. West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 (1994).
193. New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988).
194. 512 U.S. at 188.
195. Id. at 194.
196. See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 149, at 790-92; Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 895, 931-32 (1992).
197. 547 U.S. 332 (2006).
198. Id. at 338.
199. Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 746 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Edward A. Zelinsky, Cuno: The Property Tax Issue, 4 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 119, 131 (2006) ("The economic result Ohio achieved by granting property tax exemption to DaimlerChrysler could alternatively have been accomplished by comparable direct expenditures, whether in the form of grants, loans or in-kind services to DaimlerChrysler.").
200. Cuno, 386 F.3d at 746.
201. Id. at 742.
202. Id. at 743.
203. Robyn Meredith, Chrysler Wins Incentives from Toledo, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1997, at D3.
204. See Ethan Yale & Brian Galle, Muni Bonds and the Commerce Clause After United Haulers, 44 State Tax Notes 877, 879 (2007).
205. No. 06-666 (U.S. May 19, 2008).
206. 127 S. Ct. 1786 (2007); see text accompanying notes 117-22.
207. Davis, slip op. at 11.
208. Id. at 12.
209. Id.
210. Lynn A. Baker & Clayton P. Gillette, Local Government Law: Cases and Materials 394-95 (3d ed. 2004).
211. See Yale & Galle, supra note 163, at 878.
212. See Schneider, supra note 18, at 125-26.
213. See Edwin S. Mills & Wallace E. Oates, The Theory of Local Public Services and Finance: Its Relevance to Urban Fiscal and Zoning Behavior, in Fiscal Zoning and Land Use Controls: The Economic Issues 1, 6-11 (Edwin S. Mills & Wallace E. Oates eds., 1975);
214. see also Jonathan Schwartz, Prisoners of Proposition 13: Sales Taxes, Property Taxes, and the Fiscalization of Municipal Land Use Decisions, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 183, 199-200, 201-04 (1997).
215. See, e.g., S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 723 (N.J. 1975); see also William T. Bogart, "What Big Teeth You Have!": Identifying the Motivations for Exclusionary Zoning, 30 Urb. Stud. 1669, 1670-72 (1993) (discussing four motivations for exclusionary zoning, none of which has to do with environmental or land use design or planning).
216. See, e.g., Fred Dodsworth, Berkeley Looks to Stop Loss of Car Dealerships, Contra Costa Times, Jan. 12, 2006, at F4;
217. Peter Fullam, Car-Sales Taxes a Meaty Source of Revenue for Some Valley Cities, Desert Sun (Palm Springs, Cal.), Oct. 24, 1999, at 4B.
218. See Ellickson & Been, supra note 141, at 823.
219. Cf. David A. Dana, Refraining Eminent Domain: Unsupported Advocacy, Ambiguous Economics, and the Case for a New Public Use Test, 32 Vt. L. Rev. 129, 131-132 (2007) (arguing that the use of eminent domain in urban areas might offset government distortions of the land market that encourage development in exurban and rural land markets).
220. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
221. But cf. Bogart, supra note 100 (examining zoning in the context of intra- and intermetropolitan trade); Ellickson, supra note 123, at 392-402 (exploring the economic aspects of "growth controls" such as zoning regulations).
222. Peterson, supra note 17, at 24-25.
223. Fischel, supra note 100, at 229.
224. Harvey Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place, 82 Am. J. Soc. 309, 309 (1976).
225. Id.; William Fulton, The Reluctant Metropolis: The Politics of Urban Growth in Los Angeles (2001);
226. Philip Kivell, Land and the City: Patterns and Processes of Urban Change (1993).
227. Molotch, supra note 181, at 309-10.
228. 545 U.S. 469, 472 (2005).
229. 547 U.S. 332, 337-38 (2006).
230. 465 U.S. 208, 210 (1984).
231. Cf. Clayton P. Gillette, Kelo and the Local Political Process, 34 Hofstra L. Rev. 13, 14-16 (2005) (arguing that the eminent domain power is necessary to solve another political problem - that of individual landowners who hold out against the majority will).
232. See sources cited supra note 22; see also Tresa Baldas, States Ride Post-'Kelo' Wave of Legislation, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 2, 2005, at P1, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1122899714395# (describing movements in several states to prevent the use of eminent domain for private development).
233. See Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. Am. Hist. 970, 970-76 (1975).
234. Clayton Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon's Rule, or, Can Public Choice Theory Justify Local Government Law?, 67 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 959, 964-65 (1991);
235. McCurdy, supra note 189, at 970-76. The Progressive Era home rule movement that followed came at this problem from a different angle. Some home rulers saw state legislative intervention on behalf of corporate money as the real source of local rent-seeking. State legislators were seen to be using municipal contracts as sources of political graft. David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2255, 2292-95 (2003). Only by protecting city politics from state interference could cities turn to the business of real municipal reform. Reformers sought to prevent state legislatures from interfering in local political processes by giving cities a sphere of authority protected from the corrupt influence of state legislative bosses.
236. See, e.g., Barron, supra, at 2289-2334 (describing the historical evolution of home rule as a package of grants to and limits on local power); Robert C. Brooks, Metropolitan Free Cities: A Thoroughgoing Municipal Home Rule Policy, 30 Pol. Sci. Q. 222 (1915) (describing problems of corruption and tension between state and local authorities, and proposing home rule as a potential solution by expanding the functions that a municipality can exercise without state interference);
237. Richard C. Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities? On the Power of Local Executives in a Federal System, 115 Yale L.J. 2542, 2565-66 (2006).
238. But see Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 611, 657-59 (1988) (arguing that mobile capital owes duties to local communities that can be vindicated through property law).
239. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 338-39 (2006).
240. Bogart, supra note 8, at 236; Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 377, 391-92 (1996).
241. But see Clayton P. Gillette, Business Incentives, Interstate Competition, and the Commerce Clause, 82 Minn. L. Rev. 447, 453-55 (1997);
242. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Compared to What? Tiebout and the Comparative Merits of Congress and the States in Constitutional Federalism, in The Tiebout Model at Fifty 239, 260 (William Fischel ed., 2006).
243. See, e.g., Terry F. Buss, The Effect of State Tax Incentives on Economic Growth and Firm Location Decisions: An Overview of the Literature, 15 Econ. Dev. Q. 90 (2001);
244. Carlos F. Liard-Muriente, US and EU Experiences of Tax Incentives, 39 Area 186, 189-90 (2007) (reviewing literature).
245. Enrich, supra note 193, at 398; see also Bogart, supra note 8, at 238-39. Some cities and states have sought to enter into voluntary "anti- poaching" compacts but these have generally been unsuccessful. Thad Williamson et al., Making a Place for Community: Local Democracy in a Global Era 140-42 (2002). Congress has on occasion considered legislation that would address this competition, but continually fails to adopt it. See, e.g., Distorting Subsidies Limitation Act of 1997, H.R. 3044, 105th Cong. (1997).
246. See Dana, supra note 176, at 48.
247. Enrich, supra note 193, at 394 (pointing out that the burdens of tax incentives are "indirect and widely dispersed"); Gillette, supra note 193, at 470 (arguing that voters may favor projects financed with debt that will be imposed only on future generations); cf. Hills, supra note 100, at 260 (arguing that congressional lawmaking is equally susceptible to accountability problems).
248. 547 U.S. 332, 338-39 (2006).
249. For an excellent discussion of "benign" and "malign" redistributions at the local level and the capacity for courts to distinguish one from the other, see Clayton P. Gillette, Local Redistribution, Living Wage Ordinances, and Judicial Intervention, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1057 (2007).
250. See Dana, supra note 176, at 28.
251. Thanks to Lee Fennell for this point.
252. Camden, 65 U.S. at 221-22.
253. Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 745-46 (6th Cir. 2004).
254. See generally Gillette, supra note 199 (discussing the various political forces that might induce localities to engage in certain redistribution projects).
255. 526 U.S. 489, 506 (1999) ("[T]he Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment expressly equates citizenship with residence: 'That Clause does not provide for, and does not allow for, degrees of citizenship based on length of residence.'").
256. Michael H. Schill, Deconcentrating the Inner City Poor, 67 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 795, 799-804 (1991);
257. see also Laurent Gobillon et al., The Mechanisms of Spatial Mismatch, 44 Urb. Stud. 2401, 2403-04 (2007);
258. John F. Kain, A Pioneer's Perspective on the Spatial Mismatch Literature, 41 Urb. Stud. 7, 20-24 (2004).
259. See supra text accompanying notes 129-30. For an argument that the antidiscrimination standard is both unpredictable and arbitrary, see Shaviro, supra note 155, at 936.
260. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1994); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978).
261. See, e.g., Neil K. Komasar, Law's Limits: The Rule of Law and the Supply and Demand of Rights 60-61 (2001).
262. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1798 (2007). But cf. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494-523 (O'Connor, J., dissenting; Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that there must be a "judicial check" on how the public use requirement is interpreted).
263. Charles L. Black, Jr., Perspectives on the American Common Market, in Regulation, Federalism, and Interstate Commerce 65 (A. Dan Tarlock ed., 1981);
264. Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 Yale L.J. 425, 446-55 (1982); Regan, supra note 1, at 1165, 1204.
265. See Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. Rev. 125, 130-33 (1979).
266. See Gillette, supra note 193, at 469-76; see also Hills, supra note 100, at 313 n.101.
267. See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 155, at 931-32.
268. The concern about railroad power that animated the Dillon's Rule reforms of the nineteenth century is an example. See Teaford, supra note 45, at 9-10.
269. See, e.g., Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 473, 543-45 (1991). But see Sterk, supra note 104, at 833-34 (challenging the exit account).
270. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416 (1956).
271. Peterson, supra note 17, at 18-19.
272. Been, supra note 216, at 511; see also Christopher Serkin, Big Difference for Small Governments: Local Governments and the Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1624, 1661-62 (2006);
273. cf. Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-To-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210, 1233-35 (1992) (arguing that decentralized environmental regulation need not result in a "race to the bottom").
274. Peterson, supra note 17, at 36-38, 41-44.
275. This puzzle has led Clayton Gillette to offer a number of explanatory theories. See Gillette, supra note 199, at 1067-88.
276. See also Hills, supra note 193, at 244-47 (observing three causes of externalizing costs); cf. Fischel, supra note 100, at 272-75 (noting that even judicial regulation cannot effectively prevent exclusion).
277. See S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151 (1975); cf. Richard Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 1824, 1854-55 (2003) (reviewing Fischel, supra note 100) (arguing that increased state and regional authority is necessary to protect undesirable residents).
278. Tiebout, supra note 217, at 419. Note also that Tieboutian local governments have no internal economies. Because they are jobless places with unlimited revenue, they have no concern for local economic development per se.
279. See, e.g., Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law: Adjusting the Scale of Property Protection, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 883, 885-86 (2007).
280. Fischel, supra note 100, at 283-85.
281. Id. at 283.
282. Been, supra note 216, at 545.
283. See Been, supra note 216, at 478; cf. Hills, supra note 193, at 57-59 (arguing that interjurisdictional competition will prevent excessive subsidies).
284. Cf. Hills, supra note 100, at 310-15 (drawing a distinction between localities and states on the grounds that the former are more likely to be "affective communities" than the latter).
285. See, e.g., Nantucket, Mass., Code art. 3, § 139-12(H)(2) ("The purpose and intent of the Formula Business Exclusion District . . . is to address the adverse impact of nationwide, standardized businesses on Nantucket's historic downtown area. The proliferation of formula businesses will have a negative impact on the island's economy, historical relevance, and unique character and economic vitality."), available at http://www.generalcode. com/webcode2.html (follow "Massachusetts" hyperlink; then follow "Nantucket" hyperlink; then search "Code Search Form" for "139"; then follow "Chapter 139: Zoning" hyperlink); see also Island Silver & Spice, Inc. v. Islamorada, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1291 (S.D. Fla. 2007) ("In general, preserving a small town community is a legitimate purpose [of local government regulation.]"); Loreto Dev. Co. v. Village of Chardon, 119 Ohio App. 3d 524, 529 (1996) (holding that a town had a legitimate interest in protecting its small town character by restricting the size of stores).
286. Cf. C & A Carbone v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) ("The central rationale for the rule against discrimination is to prohibit state or municipal laws whose object is local economic protectionism, laws that would excite those jealousies and retaliatory measures the Constitution was designed to prevent.").
287. Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 Va. L. Rev. 959, 962 (2007) ("Local governments often give life to the Madisonian fear of the tyranny of local majorities: they sometimes reinforce racial, ethnic, and economic segregation; exclude outsiders; and generate significant externalities for neighboring communities."); see also Rossi, supra note 132, at 560 (defending municipal-state antitrust immunity distinction on grounds that local political processes are more susceptible to interest-group capture). I am less convinced that regulatory decentralization to small-scale local governments will systematically lead to majoritarian oppression, at least in the context of the local regulation of religion.
288. See Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1810, 1811-20 (2004).
289. Edmund W. Kitch, Regulation and the American Common Market, in Regulation, Federalism, and Interstate Commerce 7, 13-14 (A. Dan Tarlock ed., 1981); see also Been, supra note 216, at 543-45 (arguing that interlocal competition will prevent localities from over-regulating or over-charging). But see Fischel, supra note 100, at 260 (arguing that localities are more likely than states to over-exclude).
290. Myron Orfield, American MetroPolitics: The New Suburban Reality 2-3 (2002).
291. Id. at 16-17.
292. Id. at 44-48. See generally Joel Garreau, Edge City: Life on the New Frontier (1991).
293. Enrich, supra note 193, at 398; see also Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 Geo. L.J. 1985, 1987 (2000) (discussing the metropolitan-area competition for investment and arguing that predominantly black suburbs often lose).
294. David J. Barron & Gerald E. Frug, Defensive Localism: A View of the Field from the Field, 21 J.L. & Pol. 261, 261-62 (2005) (arguing that suburbs exercise a form of "defensive localism" rather than a form of "local autonomy"). Richard Briffault has also written eloquently and extensively about the defensive and privatized politics of the suburbs. Briffault, supra note 5, at 382-93, 435-47.
295. Fischel, supra note 100, at 184-89.
296. See id. at 8-10 (stating that homeowners' intolerance for risk drives them to keep out development, even if the risk of harm to them is slight).
297. William H. Lucy, Tomorrow's Cities, Tomorrow's Suburbs (Planner's Press 2006); Orfield, supra note 235, at 162-72.
298. Sassen, supra note 33, at 3-4.
299. Jon Blackwell, 1911: 'Trenton Makes' History, http://www.capitalcentury. com/1911.html (last visited July 1, 2008).
300. See Paul Krugman, The Self-Organizing Economy 4-5 (19%).
301. Id.; see Jacobs, supra note 11.
302. Krugman, supra note 245, at 4-5.
303. Orfield, supra note 235, at 23-28.
304. Douglas W. Rae, City: Urbanism and Its End 361-63 (2003).
305. Garreau, supra note 237, at 4-9.
306. David Rusk, Cities Without Suburbs 20 (2d ed. 1995).
307. See generally Barron, supra note 190 (analyzing the history of the state-city power struggle and advocating a new understanding of home rule as a constraint on urban sprawl).
308. Baker & Gillette, supra note 169, at 201-336.
309. See Philip Langdon, When Government Takes Too Much: Supreme Court Hears New London Land Battle, Hartford Courant, Mar. 29, 2005, at C5.
310. See id. (describing pressure on city council to approve redevelopment in order to access federal and state monies); see also William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Public Use in Poletown: How Federal Grants Encourage Excessive Use of Eminent Domain, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 929, 943 (cataloging the distorting effect of federal money on eminent domain actions in Detroit).
311. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 18, at 210-11; see also Bogart, supra note 8, at 220-23, 237-38; Enrich, supra note 193, at 380.
312. Nicholas Blomley, Kelo, Contradiction, and Capitalism, 28 Urb. Geography 198, 200 (2007); see also Sam Bass Warner, The Private City: Philadelphia in Three Periods of Growth x-xi (1968) (recognizing the centrality of private enterprise in the success of cities); Audrey G. McFarlane, Local Economic Development Incentives in an Era of Globalization: The Exploitation of Decentralization and Mobility, 35 Urb. Law. 305, 312-14 (2003) (describing the influence of private capital).
313. Charles McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Business-Government Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. Am. Hist. 970, 982 (1975) (quoting Gene M. Gressley, West by East: The American West in the Gilded Age 12 (1972)).
314. Id. at 989.
315. Id.
316. Gillette, supra note 199, at 1067.
317. Cf. Richard C. Schragger, Reclaiming the Canvassing Board: Bush v. Gore and the Political Currency of Local Government, 50 Buff. L. Rev. 393, 395-96, 407-11 (2002) (discussing the Court's "doctrine" and "shadow doctrine" of local government status).
318. But cf. Jacobs, supra note 6, at 149 ("Tariffs are of course means by which backward economies have often helped give their manufacturers a start . . . ."); id. at 168 ("Tariffs, necessary though they are in nations with undeveloped or long-stagnated cities and appreciable international trade in resources or rural products, are far from an ideal remedy for faulty and deadening feedback to cities."); Krugman, supra note 10, at 89-90 (arguing that temporary tariffs might be useful to developing economies).