Cost sharing in a joint project

Game Practice and the Environment

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 113-124

  Tijs, Stef Hendrikus ^a   Brânzei, Rodica ^b  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b ALEXANDRU IOAN CUZA UNIVERSITY OF IASI   (Romania)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 55449083706     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4337/9781845421441.00012     Document Type: Chapter

References (21)

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