Sharing the cost of a network: Core and core allocations

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 30, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 567-599

  Koster, M ^d   Molina, E ^a   Sprumont, Y ^b   Tijs, S H ^c  

^a MIGUEL HERNÁNDEZ UNIVERSITY   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

^c TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^d NONE

Author keywords

Constrained egalitarianism; Cooperative game theory; Core; Cost sharing; Tree games

Indexed keywords

EID: 18044389680     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820200099     Document Type: Article

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