Airport problems and consistent allocation rules

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 38, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 83-102

  Potters, Jos ^a   Sudhölter, Peter ^b  

^a RADBOUD UNIVERSITY NIJMEGEN   (Netherlands)

^b BIELEFELD UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

90D30; Airport game; Airport problem; Modified nucleolus; Nucleolus; Weighted Shapley value

Indexed keywords

EID: 0007264082     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00004-9     Document Type: Article

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