Voluntary contributions to multiple public projects

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 25-50

  Koster, M ^a   Reijnierse, H ^b   Voorneveld, M ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^c STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77149165009     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9779.00120     Document Type: Article

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