Career concerns, matching, and optimal disclosure policy

International Economic Review

Volumn 49, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 1211-1250

  Mukherjee, Arijit ^a  

^a MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 54249169187     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: 14682354     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2008.00511.x     Document Type: Article

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