Why does centralisation fail to internalise policy externalities?

Public Choice

Volumn 122, Issue 3-4, 2005, Pages 395-416

  Dur, Robert ^a   Roelfsema, Hein ^b  

^a ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^b UTRECHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 22044442657     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-5290-6     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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