Provision of public transport under conflicting regulatory regimes

Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice

Volumn 42, Issue 9, 2008, Pages 1176-1182

  Vickerman, Roger ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KENT   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Regulatory competition; Regulatory conflict; Wider economic impacts

Indexed keywords

EMPLOYMENT;

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; ECONOMIC IMPACTS; POTENTIAL CONFLICT; PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH; PUBLIC TRANSPORT; REGULATORY CONFLICT; REGULATORY REGIME; TRANSPORT SERVICES;

PRODUCTIVITY;

ECONOMIC IMPACT; LABOR MARKET; PUBLIC TRANSPORT; REGULATORY APPROACH; TRANSPORTATION PLANNING; URBAN TRANSPORT;

EURASIA; EUROPE;

EID: 53649109969     PISSN: 09658564     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.tra.2008.05.005     Document Type: Article

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