Product market competition and organizational slack under profit-target contracts

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 26, Issue 6, 2008, Pages 1389-1406

  Piccolo, Salvatore ^a,b,c   D'Amato, Marcello ^b,d   Martina, Riccardo ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NAPLES FEDERICO II   (Italy)

^b CSEF   (Italy)

^c TOULOUSE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (France)

^d UNIVERSITY OF SALERNO   (Italy)

Author keywords

Competing contracts; Product market competition; X inefficiency

Indexed keywords

CONTRACTS; COSTS; EARNINGS; ECONOMICS; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; MANAGERS; TARGETS;

ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY; COMPETING FIRMS; COMPETING-CONTRACTS; ORGANIZATIONAL SLACK; PRIVATE INFORMATION; PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION; U SHAPED; X-INEFFICIENCY;

COMPETITION;

EID: 53249125272     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2008.02.001     Document Type: Article

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