Competition increases x-efficiency: A limited liability mechanism

European Economic Review

Volumn 44, Issue 9, 2000, Pages 1727-1744

  Stennek, Johan ^a,b  

^a STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

^b RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS IFN   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Competition; Entry; Limited liability; x inefficiency

Indexed keywords

INDUSTRIAL COMPETITION; PRODUCTION SYSTEM; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0033745193     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(99)00014-8     Document Type: Article

References (18)

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