Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?

Mathematical and Computer Modelling

Volumn 48, Issue 9-10, 2008, Pages 1357-1373

  Zwicker, William S ^a  

^a UNION COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Connected; Consistent; Convex; Decomposition; Generalized scoring rule; Geometry of voting; Hyperplane separation; Mean neat rule; Mean proximity rule; Scoring rule; Ties; Voronoi; Voting system

Indexed keywords

AGGLOMERATION; CHARACTERIZATION; DECISION THEORY; MAGNETIC RESONANCE;

CONNECTED; CONSISTENT; CONVEX; DECOMPOSITION; GENERALIZED SCORING RULE; GEOMETRY OF VOTING; GRADING SYSTEMS; HYPERPLANE SEPARATION; MEAN NEAT RULE; MEAN PROXIMITY RULE; PREFERENCE AGGREGATIONS; RANKING OF ALTERNATIVES; SCORING FUNCTIONS; SCORING RULE; SCORING RULES; SOCIAL CHOICE; TIES; VORONOI; VOTING RULES; VOTING SYSTEM;

LAWS AND LEGISLATION;

EID: 52949091145     PISSN: 08957177     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.mcm.2008.05.031     Document Type: Article

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