Characterizations of scoring methods for preference aggregation

Annals of Operations Research

Volumn 80, Issue , 1998, Pages 299-332

  Chebotarev, Pavel Yu ^a   Shamis, Elena ^a  

^a TRAPEZNIKOV INSTITUTE OF CONTROL SCIENCES   (Russian Federation)

Author keywords

Aggregation of preferences; Borda score; Characterization; Choice; Paired comparisons; Ranking; Scoring procedures; Utilitarianism

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032389515     PISSN: 02545330     EISSN: 15729338     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1018928301345     Document Type: Article

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