Ownership structure as corporate governance mechanism: Evidence from Chinese listed companies

Economic Change and Restructuring

Volumn 34, Issue 1-2, 2001, Pages 53-72

  Chen, Jian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GREENWICH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Agency cost; Corporate governance; Corporate performance; Ownership structure

Indexed keywords

EID: 52549098359     PISSN: 15739414     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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