Choice of contracts in the British National Health Service: An empirical study

Journal of Health Economics

Volumn 27, Issue 5, 2008, Pages 1155-1167

  Chalkley, Martin ^a   McVicar, Duncan ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF DUNDEE   (United Kingdom)

^b QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY BELFAST   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

British NHS; Financial incentives; Health services; Physician agency

Indexed keywords

HEALTH CARE; HEALTH POLICY; HEALTH SERVICES; INCENTIVE; LOGIT ANALYSIS; MARKET;

ARTICLE; CONTRACT; EMPIRICISM; FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT; HEALTH CARE; HEALTH CARE DELIVERY; HEALTH CARE POLICY; NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE; PURCHASING;

CHOICE BEHAVIOR; COMMUNITY HEALTH SERVICES; CONTRACT SERVICES; CONTRACTS; DECISION MAKING, ORGANIZATIONAL; EMPIRICAL RESEARCH; GREAT BRITAIN; HEALTH CARE COSTS; HEALTH CARE REFORM; HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH; HOSPITALS, PUBLIC; HUMANS; LOGISTIC MODELS; MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES; MODELS, ECONOMETRIC; NEGOTIATING; PRIMARY HEALTH CARE; PURCHASING, HOSPITAL; STATE MEDICINE; TERMINOLOGY AS TOPIC;

EURASIA; EUROPE; UNITED KINGDOM; WESTERN EUROPE;

EID: 50249153465     PISSN: 01676296     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2008.05.005     Document Type: Article

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