Pawns and queens revisited: Public provision of private goods when individuals make mistakes

International Tax and Public Finance

Volumn 15, Issue 5, 2008, Pages 599-619

  Pirttilä, Jukka ^a   Tenhunen, Sanna ^b,c  

^a LABOUR INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (Finland)

^b TAMPERE UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Finland)

^c Helsinki Center of Economic Research   (Finland)

Author keywords

Behavioural economics; Optimal taxation; Public provision

Indexed keywords

EID: 50249097673     PISSN: 09275940     EISSN: 15736970     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10797-007-9045-9     Document Type: Article

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