Non-welfarist optimal taxation and behavioral public economics

Journal of Economic Surveys

Volumn 20, Issue 5, 2006, Pages 849-868

  Kanbur, Ravi ^a   Pirttilä, Jukka ^b   Tuomala, Matti ^c  

^a Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

^b Labour Institute for Economic Research   (Finland)

^c TAMPERE UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Finland)

Author keywords

Behavioural economics; Non welfarism; Optimal taxation

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC POLICY; TAX SYSTEM; WELFARE ECONOMICS;

EID: 33751104180     PISSN: 09500804     EISSN: 14676419     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6419.2006.00268.x     Document Type: Article

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