In-kind transfers, self-selection and optimal tax policy

European Economic Review

Volumn 41, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 97-114

  Cremer, Helmuth ^a   Gahvari, Firouz ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

In kind transfers; Optimal tax policy; Self selection

Indexed keywords

INCOME REDISTRIBUTION; PARETO-EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS; PUBLIC PROVISION; SELF-SELECTION; SOCIAL POLICY; TAX POLICY;

EID: 0031392889     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0014-2921(95)00131-X     Document Type: Article

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