Enforcing the Kyoto Protocol: Sanctions and strategic behavior

Energy Policy

Volumn 33, Issue 16, 2005, Pages 2112-2122

  Hagem, Cathrine ^a,b   Kallbekken, Steffen ^a   Mæstad, Ottar ^c   Westskog, Hege ^a  

^a CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH OSLO CICERO   (Norway)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OSLO   (Norway)

^c SNF ^*  (Norway)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; SOCIAL ASPECTS; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

KYOTO PROTOCOL; SANCTION MECHANISMS; STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS;

ENERGY POLICY;

CLIMATE CHANGE; COMPLIANCE; ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING; INCENTIVE; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT; KYOTO PROTOCOL; SANCTION;

EID: 13844298939     PISSN: 03014215     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2004.04.008     Document Type: Article

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