Limited enforcement and the organization of production

Journal of Macroeconomics

Volumn 30, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 1222-1245

  Quintin, Erwan ^a  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS   (United States)

Author keywords

Economic development; Limited enforcement; Organization of production

Indexed keywords

EID: 49649101140     PISSN: 01640704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmacro.2007.05.005     Document Type: Article

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