Debt targets and fiscal sustainability in an era of monetary independence

International Economics and Economic Policy

Volumn 5, Issue 1-2, 2008, Pages 165-187

  Hughes Hallett, Andrew ^a,b  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Center for Economic and Policy Research   (United States)

Author keywords

Debt rule; Institutional coordination; Soft targets; Stackelberg leadership

Indexed keywords

EID: 48649107668     PISSN: 16124804     EISSN: 16124812     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10368-008-0109-9     Document Type: Conference Paper

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