Sharing a river among satiable agents

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 64, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 35-50

  Ambec, Stefan ^a   Ehlers, Lars ^b  

^a TOULOUSE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (France)

^b Canada H3A 2T7   (Canada)

Author keywords

Core solutions; Externalities; Fairness; Water allocation

Indexed keywords

EID: 48649090928     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.09.005     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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