Fair allocation in networks with externalities

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 58, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 354-364

  Navarro, Noemí ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NAVARRA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Allocation rules; Myerson value; Networks

Indexed keywords

EID: 33751547534     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.010     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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