Sharing a polluted river

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 60, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 176-186

  Ni, Debing ^a   Wang, Yuntong ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ELECTRONIC SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OF CHINA   (China)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR   (Canada)

Author keywords

Externality; Fair allocation of pollution costs; Shapley value

Indexed keywords

EID: 34249080112     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.001     Document Type: Article

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