A new solution to the paradoxes of rational acceptability

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Volumn 53, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 391-410

  Douven, Igor ^a  

^a ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040078073     PISSN: 00070882     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/bjps/53.3.391     Document Type: Article

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