Inequity aversion and team incentives

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 110, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 297-320

  Rey Biel, Pedro ^a  

^a UNIVERSITAT AUTÒNOMA DE BARCELONA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Behavioral contract theory; Inequity aversion; Team incentives

Indexed keywords

EMPLOYMENT GENERATION; EQUITY; LABOR POLICY; MODEL; OPTIMIZATION; PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT; PROFITABILITY;

EID: 48249122385     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: 14679442     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2008.00540.x     Document Type: Article

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