Endogenous leadership in teams

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 162, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 253-261

  Huck, Stephen ^a   Rey Biel, Pedro ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITAT AUTÒNOMA DE BARCELONA   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745818551     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1628/093245606777583495     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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2. FALK, A., AND A. ICHINO [2003], "Clean Evidence on Peer Effects," Mimeo, University of Zurich.
3. FEHR, E., AND K. SCHMIDT [1999], "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 817-868.
4. GÄCHTER, S., AND E. RENNER [2004], "Leading by Example in the Presence of Free Rider Incentives," Mimeo, University of St. Gallen.
5. HAMILTON, H., AND S. SLUTSKY [1990], "Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Games: Stackelberg or Cournot Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, 2, 29-47.
6. HEHENKAMP, B., AND O. KAARBØE [2004], "Who Should Receive Weaker Incentives? Peer Pressure in Teams," Mimeo, University of Bergen.
7. HERMALIN, B. [1998], "Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example," American Economic Review, 88, 1188-1206.
8. HOLMSTRÖM, B. [1982], "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, 13, 324-340.
9. VAN DAMME, E., AND S. HURKENS [1999], "Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership," Games and Economic Behavior, 28, 105-129.