Divining nuclear intentions: A review essay

International Security

Volumn 33, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 139-169

  Potter, William C ^a,b   Mukhatzhanova, Gaukhar ^b,c  

^a Department of Nonproliferation Studies ^*

^b MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES   (United States)

^c James Martin Center

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 47949130388     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.2008.33.1.139     Document Type: Article

References (106)

1. William M. Arkin, "The Sky-Is-Still-Falling Profession," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 50, No. 2 (March /April 1994), p. 64.
2. An early, notable exception to this general tendency is Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). Although not primarily oriented toward forecasting, a number of unpublished dissertations on nonproliferation themes display an admirable mix. of empirical research and theory.
3. See, in particular, Tanya Ogilvie-White, "Theorizing Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: Understanding the Nuclear Politics of India, South Africa, and Ukraine," University of Southampton, 1998;
4. James J. Walsh, "Bombs Unbuilt: Power, Ideas, and Institutions in International Politics," Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001;
5. Maria Rost Rublee, "Persuasion, Social Conformity, and Identification: Constructivist Explanations for NonNuclear States in a Nuclear World," George Washington University, 2004;
6. Alexander H. Montgomery, "Social Action, Rogue Reaction: U.S. Post-Cold War Nuclear Counterproliferation Strategies," Stanford University, 2005;
7. Karthika Sasikumar, "Regimes at Work: The Nonproliferation Order and Indian Nuclear Policy," Cornell University, 2006;
8. and Matthew H. Kroenig, "The Enemy of My Enemy Is My Customer: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance," University of California, Berkeley, 2007. Several recent quantitative studies also are noteworthy for their attentiveness
9. to empiricism and theory in exploring proliferation determinants. See Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way, "The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 6 (December 2004), pp. 859-885;
10. Christopher R. Way and Karthika Sasikumar, "Leaders and Laggards: When and Why Do Countries Sign the NPT?" REGIS Working Paper, No. 16 (Montreal: University of Montreal/McGill University, November 2004), presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, September 1-4, 2005;
11. and DongJoon Jo and Erik Gartzke, "Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 51, No. 1 (February 2007), pp. 167-194.
12. Jacques EC Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006);
13. and Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Alternative Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007). Further references to these volumes appear parenthetically in the text.
14. See, for example, Peter R. Lavoy, "Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," in Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds., The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and What Results (London: Frank Cass, 1993), pp. 192-212;
15. Ariel E. Levite, "Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 59-88;
16. T.V. Paul, Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000);
17. Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build. Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 54-86;
18. and Walsh, "Bombs Unbuilt."
19. As Tanya Ogilvie-White points out, the word, "puzzle" has been used to connote a variety of proliferation issues, involving both causes and effects. Ogilvie-White, "Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Fall 1996), p. 43.
20. See also Davis and Frankel, The Proliferation Puzzle; and Walsh, "Bombs Unbuilt." We focus on the causes.
21. The phrase was coined by Albert Wohlstetter in Moving toward Life in a Nuclear Armed Crowd! Final Report to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Los Angeles, Calif.: Pan Heuristics, 1976).
22. The thesis in Nuclear Logics is an extension and refinement of the argument advanced in Solingen, "The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 126-169.
23. Solingen's case studies are Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Libya, North Korea, South Korea, and Taiwan.
24. The only comparable work on the same theme is the Ph.D. dissertation by James J. Walsh, "Bombs Unbuilt," which unfortunately has never been published and is not widely cited.
25. A possible exception to this rule, which is not explained in detail, is a situation in which the state (as opposed to the regime) faces an extreme threat to its survival.
26. In her book Solingen is careful to delimit the time frame under consideration to the post-1968 period. She discusses the concept of "world, time" in "Nuclear Logics: Why Some Do and. Others Don't (Proliferate): Implications for Proliferation Chains," paper presented at the Workshop on Forecasting Proliferation Developments, Washington, DC, September 27, 2007.
27. We are grateful to Scott Sagan for highlighting this contribution. Sagan, personal correspondence with authors, October 8, 2007.
28. Solingen elaborated on this point in a short paper about her book's approach in which she writes, "Balance of power, norms, and institutions may be more relevant than political survival in some cases than in others." See Solingen, "Nuclear Logics: Why Some Do and Others Don't (Proliferate)," p. 7.
29. This view is most closely associated with Lawrence Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France under the Fourth Republic (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965).
30. See Walsh, "Bombs Unbuilt"; Jim Walsh, "Surprise Down Under: The Secret History of Australia's Nuclear Ambitions," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Fall 1997), pp. 1-20;
31. and George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
32. Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, p. 370;
33. Šumit Ganguly, "India's Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi's Nuclear Weapons Program," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), p. 168;
34. and. Neil Joeck, personal communication with authors, February 15, 2008. Perkovich makes a less definitive conclusion about Rao's rationale, writing that while the prime minister "was willing in principal to authorize tests, he had not made up his mind that they were in India's interest." Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, p. 370. 17.
35. See Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, pp. 353-377.
36. Solingen, Nuclear Logics, p. 194, makes the argument that Israel had reason to doubt the impartiality of the International Atomic Energy Agency and to mistrust international institutions dominated by states opposed to it.
37. Important prior critiques include Ogilvie-White, "Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation?"; Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?"; and Jacques EC Hymans, "Theories of Nuclear Proliferation: The State of the Field," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No. 3 (November 2006), pp. 455-465. Solingen's book under review also provides a thorough critique of many international relations theories.
38. Although one could legitimately identify a larger set of influential paradigms, including many variations of neorealism, their inclusion in the comparative assessment would not significantly alter our conclusions. We have not sought to include a number of important conceptual frameworks such as those advanced by Sagan and Lavoy, which in some respects more closely resemble the orientation of Hymans and Solingen but lack predictive power.
39. For a review of the early literature on proliferation determinants, see William C. Potter, Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation: An Interdisciplinary Perspective (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn, and Hain, 1982), pp. 131-196.
40. Elegant in its simplicity, classical realism affords a powerful means to circumvent the problem of nuclear secrecy and the need, to collect difficult-to-obtain data through in-country research. For its most influential exponent, see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948).
41. The seminal work in neorealism is by Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979).
42. In his penetrating critique of neorealist models, Sagan depicts the alleged process as follows: "Every time one state develops nuclear weapons to balance against its main rival, it also creates a nuclear threat to another state in the region, which then has to initiate its own nuclear weapons program to maintain its national security." Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?" p. 58.
43. See, for example, John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56;
44. John J. Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 50-66;
45. Stephen Van Evera, "Primed, for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 7-57;
46. and Benjamin Frankel, "The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," in Davis and Frankel, The Proliferation Puzzle, pp. 37-78.
47. One possible exception is the focus of neoclassical realism on state capacity and a similar emphasis by Hymans on state structure and managerial capacity in his more recent unpublished work.
48. TV Paul, an exponent of "prudential realism," argues that superpower security guarantees are the key explanation for why typical realist forecasts of proliferation failed to materialize.
49. Her inclusion of Israel in this category is questionable, as Israel did not possess security guar-antees from the United States or any other nuclear weapons state when it decided to pursue an independent nuclear weapons program.
50. Neoclassical realism seeks to compensate for this shortcoming by employing both systemiclevel and national (unit)-level analysis. For neoclassical realists, state actions are defined not only by the structure of the international system and the state's relative position in it, but also by its capacity to extract resources and support from within the state-so-called state power. Although neoclassical realism has yet to be applied to nonproliferation, the approach has the potential to help explain different nuclear outcomes in countries facing similar security threats. Natasha Bajema is conducting dissertation research on the subject at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. For a useful introduction to neoclassical realism, see Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1 (October 1998), pp. 144-172.
51. A more recent treatment is provided by Jeffrey W Taliaferro, "State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State," Security Studies, Vol. 15, No. 3 (July-September 2006), pp. 464-495.
52. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984);
53. and Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1 (October 1985), pp. 226-254.
54. See, for example, Peter Alexis Gourevitch, "The Governance Problem in International Relations," in David A. Lake and Robert Powell, eds., Strategic Choice and International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 137-164;
55. and John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (New York: Routledge, 1998).
56. Some support for the thesis is provided by Mitchell Reiss, who is not a self-described neoliberal institutionalist. See, for example, Reiss, Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988);
57. and. Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995).
58. See also William C. Potter, "The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation: The Cases of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine," Occasional Paper, No. 22 (Washington, DC.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 1995).
59. Hymans does not comment on why, according to his own chart (p. 4), the gap between nuclear-capable and nuclear-armed states increased sharply during the 1965-70 period, precisely when the NPT was negotiated, signed, and entered into force.
60. Questions about the NPT's survivability, for example, were raised as early as in the 1970s, both before and after the first NPT review conference. A particularly insightful analysis of the challenges facing the NPT during its first decade is provided by William Epstein, The Last Chance: Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 244-258.
61. Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425;
62. and Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
63. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 887-917;
64. Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996);
65. and John Gerard Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 855-885.
66. See Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security.
67. Nina Tannenwald, "Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo," International Security, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Spring 2005), pp. 5-49.
68. Ibid., pp. 29-30; and Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change."
69. Rublee, "Persuasion, Social Conformity, and Identification."
70. Solingen, Nuclear Logics, p. 268,
71. quotes Mike Mochizuki, "Japan's Drift Away from Pacific Policy," Los Angeles Times, September 22, 2006, on how "Japan's pacifism has always been pragmatic."
72. For works that speak of chains or chain-style dynamics, see, for example, Graham Allison, "A Cascade of Nuclear Proliferation," International Herald Tribune, December 17, 2004;
73. Kofi Annan, "A More Secure World: The Future of the United Nations," speech delivered at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, Munich, Germany, February 13, 2005;
74. Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, DC.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004);
75. Ashton B. Carter, Gordon Oehler, Michael Anastasios, Robert Monroe, Keith B. Payne, Robert Pfaltzgraff, William Schneider, and William Van Cleave, "Report on Discouraging a Cascade of Nuclear Weapons States" (Washington, DC.: International Security Advisory Board., U.S. Department of State, October 19, 2007);
76. Joseph Cirincione, "Asian Nuclear Reaction Chain," Foreign Policy, No. 118 (Spring 2000), pp. 120-136;
77. Patrick Clawson, "Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East: Who Is Next after Iran?" in Henri D. Sokolski, ed., Taming the Next Set of Strategic Weapons Threats (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006), pp. 27-39;
78. James Clay Moltz, "Future Nuclear Proliferation Scenarios in Northeast Asia," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No. 3 (November 2006), pp. 591-604;
79. and George Tenet, quoted in Mitchell B. Reiss, "The Nuclear Tipping Point: Prospects for a World of Many Nuclear States," in Campbell, Einhorn and Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point, p. 4.
80. "Weapons Production in Fourth Countries: Likelihood and Consequences," National Intelligence Estimate, No. 100-6-57 (Washington, DC.: National Security Archive, June 18, 1957).
81. Ibid., p. 1. Interestingly, the same NIE concluded that "the chances now appear at least even that Japan will undertake the initial steps in a nuclear weapons production program within five years," but that the Chinese communists will be reluctant to divert resources "urgently needed, for basic economic development" and therefore "will develop a nuclear weapons program only gradually." Ibid., pp. 6-7.
82. See "Why the U.S. Keeps Talking," Time, March 29, 1963, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,896717,00.html?iid?chix-sphere. Oddly, the NIE for the same year estimated that no more than "eight countries, in addition to France, had the physical and financial resources to develop an operational nuclear capability (weapons and means of delivery) over the next decade."
83. See Directorate of Central Intelligence, "Likelihood and Consequences of a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Systems," National Intelligence Estimate, No. 4-63 (Washington DC.: National Security Archive, June 28, 1963). The countries in question were Canada, China, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and West Germany.
84. See, for example, Howard Simons, "World-Wide Capabilities for Production and Control of Nuclear Weapons," Daedalus, Vol. 88, No. 3 (Summer 1959), pp. 385-409;
85. Christopher Hohenemser, "The Nth Country Problem Today," in Seymour Melman, ed., Disarmament: Its Politics and Economics (Boston: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1962);
86. and Oskar Morgenstern, "The Nth Country Problem," Fortune, March 1961, p. 136.
87. Lewis A. Dunn and Herman Kahn, Trends in Nuclear Proliferation, 1975-1995, Final Report to the U.S. Arms Control and. Disarmament Agency (Washington, DC.: Hudson Institute, May 15, 1976). The earliest usage of the proliferation chain metaphor of which we are aware is by Sir John Cockcroft, who in 1968 expressed concern about the "likelihood of a chain reaction in which the acquisition of nuclear weapons by one country would provoke other nations to follow suit."
88. See Cockroft, "The Perils of Nuclear Proliferation," in Nigel Calder, ed., Unless Peace Comes (New York: Viking, 1968), p. 37, quoted in Walsh, "Bombs Unbuilt," p. 5.
89. Solingen does cite Lewis Dunn's 1982 book, Controlling the Bomb (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press), which includes a number of the earlier insights from Dunn and Kahn, Trends in Nuclear Proliferation.
90. The limited number of declassified NIEs precludes a more definitive statement on this point, but there is no evidence of their use in the nine NIEs we have examined for the years 1957, 1958, 1960, 1961, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1974, and 2007.
91. George Tenet, quoted, in Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, p. 208.
92. For a fascinating discussion of the use (and misuse) of metaphors (including dominoes) in foreign policy decisionmaking, see Yuen Foon Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam. Decisions (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).
93. See also Solingen's reference to the "possible nuclear domino effect or 'breakout" in East Asia" should Japan go nuclear. Solingen, Nuclear Logics, p. 260.
94. Solingen is particularly effective in critiquing neorealist notions of "reactive proliferation" in her analysis of Egyptian nuclear decisionmaking. Ibid., p. 244.
95. For an extended discussion of these intelligence failures and some more successful estimates, see Jeffrey T. Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (New York: W.W Norton, 2006).
96. For an analysis of this period as well as the initial phase of the Yugoslav program between the late 1940s and early 1960s, with which U.S. intelligence was slightly familiar, see William C. Potter, Djuro Miljanić and Ivo Slaus, "Tito's Nuclear Legacy," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 56, No. 2 (March/April 2000), pp. 63-70. According to Ambassador Roland. Timerbaev, the Soviet government also appears to have been oblivious to Tito's nuclear weapons ambitions. Personal communication by Potter with Timerbaev, April 29, 1998.
97. See also Roland Timerbaev, Rossiya i yadernoye nerasprostraneniye, 1945-1968 [Russia and nuclear nonproliferation, 1945-1968] (Moscow: Nauka, 1999).
98. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, p. 217, points to early declarations by Gorton of his nuclear ambitions before the Australian Senate.
99. Quoted in ibid. Moynihan's admonition is somewhat ironic given the total surprise he experienced fourteen years earlier as U.S. ambassador to India at the time of the first Indian nuclear detonation. See Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, p. 233.
100. It would be an interesting exercise to compare the timeliness and accuracy of the last twenty years of NIEs with the published analyses of Nuclear Fuel and Nucleonics Week reporter Mark Hibbs, whose news reports about the nuclear weapons-related activities of both state and nonstate actors often appear to be better informed than those of U.S. government spokespersons. For an account of Hibbs's reporting,
101. see William Langewiesche, The Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007).
102. This open-mindedness is more apparent in Solingen's book, but it also is reflected in the subsequent writing of Hymans. See, for example, Hymans, "Individuals, Institutions, and Nuclear Choices: A Theoretical Framework and Research Agenda," paper presented at the Workshop on Forecasting Proliferation Developments.
103. See also Jo and Gartzke, "Determinants of Nuclear Proliferation," for a recent quantitative analysis of the relationship between "latent nuclear weapons production capability" and nuclear weapons programs.
104. Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (New York: Random House, 2007);
105. and. Philip E. Tetlock, "Theory-Driven Reasoning about Plausible Pasts and Probable Futures in World Politics: Are We Prisoners of Our Preconceptions?" American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 43, No. 2 (April 1999), pp. 335-366.
106. Tetlock, "Theory-Driven Reasoning about Plausible Pasts and Probable Futures in World Politics," p. 335.