The unconventional, but conventionalist, legacy of Lewis's "convention"

Topoi

Volumn 27, Issue 1-2, 2008, Pages 115-126

  Favereau, Olivier ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS OUEST NANTERRE LA DÉFENSE   (France)

Author keywords

Action; Belief; Common knowledge; Common world; Coordination; Social practice

Indexed keywords

EID: 47949090338     PISSN: 01677411     EISSN: 15728749     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11245-008-9038-z     Document Type: Article

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