Stability and voting by committees with exit

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 229-247

  Berga, Dolors ^a   Bergantiños, Gustavo ^b   Massó, Jordi ^c   Neme, Alejandro ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GIRONA   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF VIGO   (Spain)

^c UNIVERSITAT AUTÒNOMA DE BARCELONA   (Spain)

^d UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DE SAN LUIS   (Argentina)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 4744345913     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0246-6     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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2. Barberà S (2001) An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions. Soc Choice Welfare 18: 619-653
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4. Barbera S, Sonnenschein H, Zhou L (1991) Voting by committees. Econometrica 59: 595-609
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10. Rodríguez-Álvarez C (2001) Candidate stability and voting correspondences. mimeo, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
11. Sprumont Y (1995) Strategy-proof collective choice in economic and political environments. Can J Econ 28: 68-107