Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice

Economic Theory

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 233-243

  Ehlers, Lars ^a   Weymark, John A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

^b VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Axiomatic social choice; Candidate stability; Political economy; Voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042976531     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-002-0279-6     Document Type: Article

References (7)

1. Arrow, K.J.: Social choice and individual values, 2nd edn. New York: Wiley 1963
2. Barberà, S., Dutta, B., Sen, A.: Strategy-proof social choice correspondences. Journal of Economic Theory 101, 374-394 (2001)
3. Dutta, B., Jackson, M.O., Le Breton, M.: Strategic candidacy and voting procedures. Econometrica 69, 1013-1037 (2001)
4. Eraslan, H., McLennan, A.: Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures. Unpublished manuscript, Department of Finance, University of Pennsylvania and Department of Economics, University of Minnesota (2001)
5. Grether, D.M., Plott, C.R.: Nonbinary social choice: an impossibility result. Review of Economic Studies 49, 143-149 (1982)
6. Rodríguez-Álvarez, C.: Candidate stability and voting procedures. Unpublished manuscript, Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (2001)
7. Wilson, R.B.: Social choice without the Pareto principle. Journal of Economic Theory 5, 478-486 (1972)