Tax Riots

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 75, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 649-669

  Bassetto, Marco ^a   Phelan, Christopher ^b  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ANALYTICAL METHOD; HOUSEHOLD INCOME; OPTIMIZATION; TAX SYSTEM;

EID: 45449117363     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: 1467937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00484.x     Document Type: Article

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