Government policy and the probability of coordination failures

European Economic Review

Volumn 49, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 939-973

  Ennis, Huberto M ^a   Keister, Todd ^b  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND   (United States)

^b INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO AUTÓNOMO DE MÉXICO   (Mexico)

Author keywords

Coordination problems; Equilibrium selection; Learning; Network externalities

Indexed keywords

LEARNING; POLICY STRATEGY; PROBABILITY; TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION;

EID: 13444272995     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2003.08.006     Document Type: Article

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