Internet auctions with artificial adaptive agents: A study on market design

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 67, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 394-417

  Duffy, John ^a   Ünver, M Utku ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

Agent based models; Finite automata; Genetic algorithm; Internet auctions; Sniping

Indexed keywords

EID: 45449102622     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2007.03.007     Document Type: Article

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