Anonymous pricing of efficient allocations in combinatorial economies

Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2004

Volumn 1, Issue , 2004, Pages 254-260

  Conen, Wolfram ^a   Sandholm, Tuomas ^b  

^a WESTPHALIAN UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES   (Germany)

^b Computer Science Department ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ANONYMUS PRICING; COMBINATORIALS ECONOMICS; EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS; PRICING SCHEMES;

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; CONSTRAINT THEORY; COSTS; DISTRIBUTION OF GOODS; ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS; FUNCTIONS; MARKETING; OPTIMIZATION;

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS;

EID: 4544257843     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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