Board structures around the world: An experimental investigation

Review of Finance

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 93-140

  Gillette, Ann B ^a   Noe, Thomas H ^b   Rebello, Michael J ^c  

^a KENNESAW STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 44849114329     PISSN: 15723097     EISSN: 1573692X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rof/rfm027     Document Type: Article

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