Selling favors in the lab: Experiments on campaign finance reform

Public Choice

Volumn 136, Issue 1-2, 2008, Pages 215-239

  Houser, Daniel ^a   Stratmann, Thomas ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Campaign contribution limits; Campaign finance; Experiments; Political advertising; Public finance

Indexed keywords

EID: 44749091724     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9292-z     Document Type: Article

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