Auctions or grandfathering: The political economy of tradable emission permits

Public Choice

Volumn 136, Issue 1-2, 2008, Pages 181-200

  Lai, Yu Bong ^a  

^a NATIONAL CHENGCHI UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

Auction; Environmental policy; Grandfathering; Interest groups; Lobbying; Tradable emission permits

Indexed keywords

EID: 44749091013     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9290-1     Document Type: Article

References (39)

1. Ackerman, B., & Hassler, G. (1981). Clean coal/dirty air. New Haven: Yale University Press.
2. Aidt, T. (1998). Political internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy. Journal of Public Economics, 69, 1-16.
3. Bergemann, D., & Välimäki, J. (2003). Dynamic common agency. Journal of Economic Theory, 111, 23-48.
4. Bernheim, B. D., & Whinston, M. D. (1986). Menu auction, resource allocation, and economic influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 1-31.
5. Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1975). Polluters' profits and political response: direct controls versus taxes. American Economic Review, 65, 139-47.
6. Coase, R. (1960). The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1-44.
7. Cogen Europe (2002). EU emissions trading and combined heat and power: complementary mechanisms are necessary to prevent negative consequences for cogeneration. Cogen Europe position statement.
8. Crals, E., & Vereeck, L. (2005). Taxes, tradable rights and transaction costs. European Journal of Law and Economics, 20, 199-223.
9. Cropper, M. L., Evans, W. L., Berardi, S. J., Ducla-Soares, M. M., & Portney, P. R. (1992). The determinants of pesticide regulation: a statistical analysis of EPA decision making. Journal of Political Economy, 100, 175-197.
10. Damania, R. (1999). Political competition, rent seeking and the choice of environmental policy instruments. Environmental and Resource Economics, 13, 415-433.
11. Dewees, D. (1983). Instrument choice in environmental policy. Economic Inquiry, 21, 53-71.
12. Dijkstra, B. (1998). A two-stage rent-seeking contest for instrument choice and revenue division, applied to environmental policy. European Journal of Political Economy, 14, 281-301.
13. Eurostat (2001). Combined heat and power production in the EU: summary of statistics 1994-1998. Retrieved from Statistical office of the European communities Web site: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-40- 01-012/EN/KS-40-01-012-EN.PDF.
14. Fredriksson, P. G. (1997). The political economy of pollution taxes in a small open economy. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 33, 44-58.
15. Fullerton, D., & Metcalf, G. (2001). Environmental controls, scarcity rents, and pre-existing distortions. Journal of Public Economics, 80, 249-267.
16. Gawande, K., & Bandyopadhyay, U. (2000). Is protection for sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman theory of endogenous protection. Review of Economics and Statistics, 82, 139-152.
17. Goldberg, P. K., & Maggi, G. (1999). Protection for sale: an empirical investigation. American Economic Review, 89, 1135-1155.
18. Goulder, L., Parry, I., & Burtraw, D. (1997). Revenue-raising vs. other approaches to environmental protection: the critical significance of pre-existing tax distortions. Rand Journal of Economics, 28, 708-731.
19. Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (1994). Protection for sale. American Economic Review, 84, 833-850.
20. Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (1996). Electoral competition and special interest politics. Review of Economics and Studies, 63, 265-286.
21. Hadjikhani, A., & Ghauri, P. (2001). The behavior of international firms in socio-political environments in the European Union. Journal of Business Research, 52, 263-275.
22. Hahn, R. W. (1984). Market power and transferable property rights. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 99, 753-765.
23. Hahn, R. W. (1990). The political economy of environmental regulation: towards a more unifying framework. Public Choice, 65, 21-47.
24. Hamilton, J. T. (1997). Taxes, torts, and the toxics release inventory: congressional voting on instruments to control pollution. Economic Inquiry, 35, 745-762.
25. Hamilton, J. T. (2005). Regulation through revelation: the origin and impacts of the toxics release inventory program. New York: Cambridge University Press.
26. Maeda, A. (2003). The emergence of market power in emission rights market: the role of initial permit distribution. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 24, 293-314.
27. Malik, A. (2002). Further results on permit markets with market power and cheating. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 44, 371-390.
28. Maloney, M. T., & McCormick, R. E. (1982). A positive theory of environmental quality regulation. Journal of Law and Economics, 25, 99-123.
29. Markussen, P., & Svendsen, G. T. (2005). Industry lobbying and the political economy of GHC trade in the European Union. Energy Policy, 33, 245-255.
30. Montgomery, W. (1972). Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs. Journal of Economic Theory, 5, 395-418.
31. Posner, R. (1993). Nobel laureate: Ronald Coase and methodology. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7, 195-210.
32. Rama, M., & Tabellini, G. (1998). Lobbying by capital and labor over trade and labor market policies. European Economic Review, 42, 1295-1316.
33. Stavins, R. (1995). Transaction costs and tradable permits. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 29, 133-148.
34. 2 allowance trading. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12, 69-88.
35. Svendsen, G. T. (1999). US interest groups prefer emission trading: a new perspective. Public Choice, 101, 109-128.
36. Tietenberg, T. (1999). Lessons from using transferable permits to control air pollution in the United States. In J. C. J. M. van den Bergh (Ed.), Handbook of environmental and resource economics (pp. 275-292). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
37. Van Egteren, H., & Weber, M. (1996). Marketable permits, market power, and cheating. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 30, 161-173.
38. Weck-Hannemann, H., & Frey, B. (1995). Are incentive instruments as good as economists believe? In L. Bovenberg & S. Cnossen (Eds.), Public economics and the environment in an imperfect world (pp. 173-186). Boston: Kluwer Academic.
39. Xepapadeas, A. (1997). Advanced principles in environmental policy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.