Taxes, torts, and the toxics release inventory: Congressional voting on instruments to control pollution

Economic Inquiry

Volumn 35, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 745-762

  Hamilton, James T ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031501088     PISSN: 00952583     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1997.tb01961.x     Document Type: Article

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