Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 48, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 271-291

  Hain, Roland ^a   Mitra, Manipushpak ^b  

^a Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes   (Germany)

^b INDIAN STATISTICAL INSTITUTE   (India)

Author keywords

Ex post equilibrium; First best implementability; Simple sequencing problems

Indexed keywords

EID: 3242802231     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.005     Document Type: Article

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