Achieving the first best in sequencing problems

Review of Economic Design

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 75-91

  Mitra, Manipushpak ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Budget balancedness; Dominant strategy; Efficiency; Incentive compatibility; Sequencing problems

Indexed keywords

EID: 3242768469     PISSN: 14344742     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s100580200071     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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