Concentration-based merger tests and vertical market structure

Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 50, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 661-680

  Gans, Joshua S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 44449094519     PISSN: 00222186     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/519819     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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