Bargaining, bundling, and clout: The portfolio effects of horizontal mergers

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 36, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 573-595

  O'Brien, Daniel P ^a   Shaffer, Greg ^b  

^a FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 31944432757     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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