Vertical integration in the presence of upstream competition

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 36, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 544-572

  De Fontenay, Catherine C ^a   Gans, Joshua S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 32244447872     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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