Bankruptcy and firm finance

Economic Theory

Volumn 36, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 239-266

  Krasa, Stefan ^a   Sharma, Tridib ^b   Villamil, Anne P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO AUTÓNOMO DE MÉXICO   (Mexico)

Author keywords

Bankruptcy; Contracts; Creditor protection; Debt; Default; Enforcement; Inflation; Legal environment; Limited commitment

Indexed keywords

EID: 44349125215     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-007-0267-y     Document Type: Article

References (25)

1. Altman, E.I., Bana, G.: Defaults and returns on high yield bonds: Analysis through september 30, 2002. working paper: New York University, Stern School of Business (2002)
2. Antinolfi G., Huybens E. (1998) Capital accumulation and real exchange rate behavior in a small open economy with credit market frictions. Econ Theory 12, 461-488
3. Antinolfi G., Huybens E. (2004) Domestic financial market frictions, unrestricted international capital flows, and crises in small open economies. Econ Theory 24, 811-837
4. Athreya K. (2002) Welfare implications of the bankruptcy reform act of 1999. J Monetary Econ 49, 1567-1595
5. Azariadis C., Kaas L. (2007) Is dynamic general equilibrium a theory of everything?. Econ Theory 32, 13-41
6. Bond P. (2003) Incentive compatible contractable information. Econ Theory 22, 375-394
7. Boyd J., Levine R., Smith B. (2001) The impact of inflation on financial sector performance. J Monetary Econ 47, 221-248
8. Boyd J., Smith B. (1994) How good are standard debt contracts? Stochastic versus non stochastic monitoring in a costly state verification environment. J Bus 67, 539-561
9. Carlier G., Renou L. (2005) A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions. Econ Theory 25, 497-504
10. Carlier G., Renou L. (2006) Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example. Econ Theory 28, 461-473
11. Chatterjee, S., Corbae, D., Nakajima, M., Rios-Rull, V.: A quantitative theory of unsecured consumer credit with risk of default. Econometrica (forthcoming, 2007)
12. Fama, E., French, K.: Industry costs of equity. J Fin Econ 43, 153-193
13. Gale D., Hellwig M. (1985) Incentive-compatible debt contracts: the one period problem. Rev Econ Stud 52, 647-663
14. Herranz, N., Krasa, S., Villamil, A.: The impact of entrepreneur characteristics and bankruptcy rules on firm performance. Working Paper, University of Illinois (2007)
15. Hillegeist S., Keating E., Cram D., Lundstedt K. (2004) Assessing the probability of bankruptcy. Rev Account Stud 9, 5-34
16. Jeong H., Townsend R. (2007) Sources of TFP growth: Occupational choice and financial deepening. Econ Theory 32, 179-221
17. Krasa S., Sharma T., Villamil A. (2005) Debt contracts and cooperative improvements. J Math Econ 41, 857-874
18. Krasa, S., Sharma, T., Villamil, A.: Enforcement and credit rationing. Working Paper, University of Illinois (2007)
19. Krasa S., Villamil A. (2000) Optimal contracts when enforcement is a decision variable. Econometrica 68, 119-134
20. La Porta R., de Silanes F.L., Shleifer A., Vishny R. (1998) Law and finance. J Polit Econ 106, 1113-1155
21. Lawless, R., Ferris, S.: Professional fees and other direct costs in chap 7 bankruptcies. Washington University Law Quarterly, http://ls.wustl.edu/WULQ/ 75, 1207 (1997)
22. Livshits I., MacGee J., Tertilt M. (2007) Consumer bankruptcy: a fresh start. Am Econ Rev 97, 402-418
23. Smith B. (1998) Informational asymmetries in macroeconomics and finance. Econ Theory 12, 451-460
24. Townsend R. (1979) Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification. J Econ Theory 2, 1-29
25. Williamson S. (1986) Costly monitoring, financial intermediation, and equilibrium credit rationing. J Monetary Econ 18, 159-179