A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions

Economic Theory

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 497-504

  Carlier, Guillaume ^a   Renou, Ludovic ^b,c  

^a CNRS   (France)

^b EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE   (Italy)

^c UNIVERSITAT AUTÒNOMA DE BARCELONA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Costly state verification; Heterogeneity of beliefs

Indexed keywords

EID: 21244437208     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0429-5     Document Type: Article

References (5)

1. Gale, D., Hellwig, M.: Incentive-compatible debt contracts: the one-period problem. Review of Economics Studies 52, 647-663 (1985)
2. Townsend, R.: Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification. Journal of Economic Theory 21, 265-293 (1979)
3. Townsend, R.: Information constrained insurance: the revelation principle extended. Journal of Monetary Economics 21, 411-450 (1988)
4. White, M.: Bankruptcy costs and the new bankruptcy code. Journal of Finance 38, 477-488 (1983)
5. Williamson, S. D.: Costly monitoring, financial intermediation and equilibrium credit rationing. Journal of Monetary Economics 18, 159-179 (1986)