Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: An example

Economic Theory

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 461-473

  Carlier, G ^a   Renou, L ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS DAUPHINE   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE   (Australia)

Author keywords

Costly monitoring; Debt contracts; Diversity of opinions; Pooling; Screening

Indexed keywords

EID: 23344441212     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0632-7     Document Type: Article

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