How can "cheap talk" yield coordination, given a conflict?

Mind and Society

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 95-108

  Jeffreys, Mark ^a  

^a UTAH VALLEY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Cheap talk; Cooperation; Coordination; Game; Language; Linguistic diversity

Indexed keywords

EID: 43949110984     PISSN: 15937879     EISSN: 18601839     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11299-007-0042-6     Document Type: Article

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